War, Law, and Narrative: A Facilitation of Permissive Legal Interpretation

战争、法律和叙事：促进许可性法律解释

• 批准号: 2491268
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Manchester
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2491268
• 关键词: War; Law; Narrative; Facilitation; Permissive

International law (IL) allows states to use force in self-defence (and as authorised by the UN Security Council). This right is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, but requires that force is proportional to the threat defended against. International Humanitarian Law (IHL), regulating the conduct of force, has as a stated purpose to protect individuals against the impact of violence (Pictet, 1951). To this end, it requires that violence is proportional to military objectives, that no unnecessary suffering is imposed, and distinctions are made between civilians and combatants. These two bodies of law - self-defence and IHL - should restrict a state's ability to conduct violence in their international relations. However, when the UN General Assembly turned to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to seek an opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in 1996, the ICJ concluded that it was possible that an extreme necessity of self-defence might arise where the use of nuclear weapons would be legal. Proportionality under both bodies of law should ensure that only the minimal violence necessary to achieve a state's legitimate military objective should be used, therefore individuals should be protected against extreme violence. However, in this case, the law was read by judges to potentially sanction the use of nuclear weapons, which would cause extreme suffering and mass killing. How such an interpretation of IL is possible, is the question guiding this proposed project.My research question is: how does international law pertaining to force expose individuals to violence? I will answer this through a focus on the role of narratives in shaping law's meaning. In the ICJ case, the lack of a definitive legal answer was due to the fact that the Court was asked to make an abstract judgement, not to interpret law for a specific case. Hence, it was tasked with interpreting law without a narrative to facilitate interpretation. Regarding the law of self-defence, the Court determined that if the threat faced by a state was grave, law could sanction the use of nuclear weapons. Regarding IHL, the Court again determined, that the military objective would determine the intensity of violence permitted. Hence, if the threat defended against was grave - e.g. a state's annihilation - then the extreme violence that nuclear weapons would impose, would be legally sanctioned. But whether there is a grave threat, is a matter of an interpretation of facts: this is a narrative (Wibben, 2010). This suggests, as Cover (1989) tells us, that no law even exists without a narrative to give it meaning. Therefore, to understand how IL is interpreted to justify violence, I will interrogate the role of narratives in extracting permissive legal interpretations.There are two strands to my approach. First I will interrogate the narratives which root the law. The laws regulating force were crafted to deal with the challenges in the world as envisaged by the drafters. This world is an interpretation of reality, a narrative. Therefore, these laws - constructed for this world - have an underlying logic. Understanding this will tell us what permissions are inherent in this law. Then, I will interrogate how the narratives for which law is read allow states to draw permissive interpretations. IL requires a narrative to facilitate interpretation. I will examine instances where IL is interpreted permissively, and in these cases I will seek to understand the role of narratives in extracting permissive interpretations. This will tell us how far narratives constructed outside the law enable violence within the law. A narrative approach to understanding law is developed by Robert Cover in Nomos and Narrative (1983). Although Cover's analysis is directed at national law, his call to understand that '[no law] exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning' (Cover, 1983, p.4) can be applied to international law.

国际法允许各国在自卫时使用武力（并经联合国安理会理事会授权）。这一权利载于《联合国宪章》第五十一条，但要求武力与所抵御的威胁成比例。国际人道主义法规范武力的行为，其明确的目的是保护个人免受暴力的影响（Pictet，1951）。为此，它要求暴力与军事目标相称，不造成不必要的痛苦，并区分平民和战斗人员。自卫和国际人道法这两大法律体系应当限制一国在其国际关系中实施暴力的能力。然而，当联合国大会于1996年向国际法院寻求关于使用核武器的合法性的意见时，国际法院得出结论认为，在使用核武器是法律的的情况下，可能出现极端必要的自卫。两个法律体系下的相称性应确保只使用实现国家合法军事目标所需的最低限度暴力，因此应保护个人免受极端暴力。然而，在这种情况下，法官宣读的法律可能会制裁使用核武器，这将造成极端痛苦和大规模杀戮。我的研究问题是：关于武力的国际法如何使个人暴露于暴力之下？我将通过关注叙事在塑造法律含义中的作用来回答这个问题。在国际法院一案中，缺乏明确的法律的答案是因为要求法院作出抽象的判决，而不是为具体案件解释法律。因此，它的任务是解释法律，而不需要说明以方便解释。关于自卫法，法院裁定，如果一个国家面临严重威胁，法律可以批准使用核武器。关于国际人道主义法，法院再次裁定，军事目标将决定所允许的暴力强度。因此，如果防御的威胁是严重的-例如一个国家的毁灭-那么核武器将施加的极端暴力将受到法律制裁。但是否存在严重威胁，是对事实的解释问题：这是一种叙述（Wibben，2010）。正如Cover（1989）告诉我们的那样，这表明，如果没有一个叙述来赋予它意义，任何法律都不会存在。因此，为了理解IL是如何被解释为暴力辩护的，我将探究叙事在提取宽容的法律的解释中的作用。首先，我将询问那些作为法律根源的叙述。制定规范武力的法律是为了应对起草者所设想的世界挑战。这个世界是对现实的一种解释，一种叙述。因此，这些为这个世界构建的法则有一个潜在的逻辑。理解这一点将告诉我们什么许可是这个法律所固有的。然后，我将询问法律被阅读的叙述如何允许国家得出宽容的解释。IL需要叙述以便于解释。我将研究IL被随意解释的例子，在这些情况下，我将试图理解叙事在提取随意解释中的作用。这将告诉我们，在法律之外构建的叙事在多大程度上允许法律之内的暴力。理解法律的叙事方法是由罗伯特·科弗在《Nomos and Narrative》（1983）中提出的。虽然Cover的分析是针对国内法的，但他呼吁理解"[没有任何法律]的存在是脱离了确定其位置并赋予其意义的叙述“（Cover，1983年，第4页），这一呼吁也适用于国际法。