Whistleblowing in Indefinitely Repeated Social Dilemma Games

大量的社会经济现象要求个人在个人利益和群体利益不一致时愿意合作，而我们如何在无限重复的社会困境中维持长期合作的问题一直是行为经济学的基本主题之一。该项目考虑了举报人——一种关键的集中惩罚制度——对违反规范的行为实施制裁依赖于一个监督违反规范行为的中央监察员，从而对举报人直接处以罚款。集中惩罚制度在现实生活中并不罕见。例如，当人们超速驾驶时，货币制裁来自一个中央权威机构——例如警察——而不是社会的其他成员。拟议的研究计划旨在解决以下研究问题：RQ1：为了维持合作规范，个人对举报的成本有多敏感？RQ2：面对告密的机会，玩家会采取什么策略？RQ3：在考虑非货币性（无成本）与货币性（有成本）类型的举报时，如何确定合作规范？最近的实验通过执行诱导玩家的策略来解释行为（参见Dal Bo & Frechette（2019）和Embrey， Mengel & Peeters(2017)）。两篇论文都发现，大多数受试者都依赖于诸如“总是缺陷”（静态纳什）、以牙还牙和严酷触发等策略。从理论上讲，合作也可能是长期互动中的一种平衡（例如，参见Friedman（1971）提出的无限重复框架的民间定理，以及随后Kandori（1992）和Ellison（1994）提出的随机匹配扩展）。鉴于相互合作在理论上是一种均衡，实验证据表明，陌生人或伙伴之间可能不会出现合作(Camera & Casari (2009)；Dal Bo & Frechette(2011))，提出了一个问题，即在告密的情况下，玩家会采取哪种策略。我们将采用的主要方法是理论和实验。具体来说，有必要定义什么是对社区不利的行为，以及举报人的确切罚款金额。现有证据表明，个体关心他人和他人对自己的看法（见Fehr & Fischbacher（2002）的总结），因此我们提出以下两个假设：假设1：不可忽略的一部分受试者会举报他人，即使举报是昂贵的。假设2：举报会强化合作规范，高成本会阻碍举报人举报不法行为。[参考资料]camera， G.和Casari， M.(2009)，“未来阴影下陌生人之间的合作”，《美国经济评论》99(3),979-1005。（2019），“无限重复囚徒困境中的策略选择”，《经济评论》第10期，第3 - 6页。Dal Bo， P.和Frechette， G.(2011)，“无限重复博弈中合作的演变：实验证据”，《美国经济评论》101,411-429。Ellison， G.(1994)，“匿名随机匹配下囚徒困境中的合作”，《经济研究评论》61,567 -588。Embrey， M., Mengel， F. & Peeters， R.(2017)，“在战略替代和互补的无限重复博弈中引出策略”，工作文件。Fehr， E. & Fischbacher， U.(2002)，“为什么社会偏好很重要——非自私动机对竞争、合作和激励的影响”，《经济杂志》112(478)，第1-33页。Friedman， J. W.(1971)，“超级博弈的非合作均衡”，《经济研究评论》第38期，第1-12页。Kandori， M.(1992)，“社会规范和社区执行”，《经济研究评论》第59期，第63-80页。

A large range of socio-economic phenomena require that individuals are willing to cooperate when individual interests and group benefits are at odds and the question of how we can sustain long-run cooperation in infinitely repeated social dilemma situations has been one of the fundamental themes in behavioural economics. This project considers whistleblowing- a key centralised punishment regime - whereby imposing sanctions for norm violation relies on a central monitor who observes the norm violation, resulting in a direct fine on the person whistleblown. Centralised punishment regimes are not rarely observed in real-life environments. For example, when people drive fast, monetary sanctioning comes from a centralised authority - e.g., the police - not by other members of the society.The proposed research programme aims at addressing the following research questions:RQ1: How sensitive are individuals to the cost of whistleblowing in order to sustain cooperative norms?RQ2: Which strategies do players adopt in the presence of whistleblowing opportunities? RQ3: How are cooperation norms determined when considering non-monetary (costless) vs. monetary (costly) types of whistleblowing?Recent experiments explain behaviour by implementing eliciting players' strategies (see Dal Bo & Frechette (2019) and Embrey, Mengel & Peeters (2017)). Both papers find that most subjects rely on strategies such as 'always defect' (static nash), tit-for-tat and grim trigger. In theory, cooperation is also possible to be an equilibrium in a long-run interaction (e.g., see the folk theorems for infinitely repeated framework by Friedman (1971) and subsequent random matching extensions in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994)). Given that mutual cooperation is an equilibrium in theory, experimental evidence shows that cooperation may not arise among strangers or partners (Camera & Casari (2009); Dal Bo & Frechette (2011)), raising the question of which strategies players adopt in the presence of whistleblowing.The main methodology we will employ is theory and experiments. Specifically, it is necessary to define what are unfavorable behaviors to the community and the exact quantity of a fine for a person who is whistleblown. Existing evidence shows that individuals are concerned about others and others' perceptions about themselves (see Fehr & Fischbacher (2002) for a summary), we therefore formulate the following two hypotheses:Hypothesis 1: A non-negligible fraction of subjects will blow the whistle on others even when whistleblowing is costly.Hypothesis 2: Whistleblowing will strengthen the cooperation norms and a high cost will deter whistleblowers from reporting the wrongdoing.ReferencesCamera, G. & Casari, M. (2009), 'Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future', American Economic Review 99(3), 979-1005. Dal Bo, P. & Frechette, G. (2019), 'Strategy Choice In The Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma', American Economic Review 109(11), 3929-3952. Dal Bo, P. & Frechette, G. (2011), 'The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence', American Economic Review 101, 411-429. Ellison, G. (1994), 'Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching', Review of Economic Studies 61, 567-588.Embrey, M., Mengel, F. & Peeters, R. (2017), 'Eliciting strategies in indefinitely repeated games of strategic substitutes and complements', Working Paper.Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. (2002), 'Why social preferences matter - the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives', The Economic Journal 112(478), 1-33.Friedman, J. W. (1971), 'A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames', Review of Economic Studies 38, 1-12.Kandori, M. (1992), 'Social norms and community enforcement', Review of Economic Studies 59, 63-80.