Whistleblowing in Indefinitely Repeated Social Dilemma Games

无限重复的社会困境游戏中的举报

• 批准号: 2594919
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Birmingham
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2021 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2594919
• 关键词: Whistleblowing; Indefinitely; Repeated; Social; Dilemma

A large range of socio-economic phenomena require that individuals are willing to cooperate when individual interests and group benefits are at odds and the question of how we can sustain long-run cooperation in infinitely repeated social dilemma situations has been one of the fundamental themes in behavioural economics. This project considers whistleblowing- a key centralised punishment regime - whereby imposing sanctions for norm violation relies on a central monitor who observes the norm violation, resulting in a direct fine on the person whistleblown. Centralised punishment regimes are not rarely observed in real-life environments. For example, when people drive fast, monetary sanctioning comes from a centralised authority - e.g., the police - not by other members of the society.The proposed research programme aims at addressing the following research questions:RQ1: How sensitive are individuals to the cost of whistleblowing in order to sustain cooperative norms?RQ2: Which strategies do players adopt in the presence of whistleblowing opportunities? RQ3: How are cooperation norms determined when considering non-monetary (costless) vs. monetary (costly) types of whistleblowing?Recent experiments explain behaviour by implementing eliciting players' strategies (see Dal Bo & Frechette (2019) and Embrey, Mengel & Peeters (2017)). Both papers find that most subjects rely on strategies such as 'always defect' (static nash), tit-for-tat and grim trigger. In theory, cooperation is also possible to be an equilibrium in a long-run interaction (e.g., see the folk theorems for infinitely repeated framework by Friedman (1971) and subsequent random matching extensions in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994)). Given that mutual cooperation is an equilibrium in theory, experimental evidence shows that cooperation may not arise among strangers or partners (Camera & Casari (2009); Dal Bo & Frechette (2011)), raising the question of which strategies players adopt in the presence of whistleblowing.The main methodology we will employ is theory and experiments. Specifically, it is necessary to define what are unfavorable behaviors to the community and the exact quantity of a fine for a person who is whistleblown. Existing evidence shows that individuals are concerned about others and others' perceptions about themselves (see Fehr & Fischbacher (2002) for a summary), we therefore formulate the following two hypotheses:Hypothesis 1: A non-negligible fraction of subjects will blow the whistle on others even when whistleblowing is costly.Hypothesis 2: Whistleblowing will strengthen the cooperation norms and a high cost will deter whistleblowers from reporting the wrongdoing.ReferencesCamera, G. & Casari, M. (2009), 'Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future', American Economic Review 99(3), 979-1005. Dal Bo, P. & Frechette, G. (2019), 'Strategy Choice In The Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma', American Economic Review 109(11), 3929-3952. Dal Bo, P. & Frechette, G. (2011), 'The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: Experimental evidence', American Economic Review 101, 411-429. Ellison, G. (1994), 'Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma with anonymous random matching', Review of Economic Studies 61, 567-588.Embrey, M., Mengel, F. & Peeters, R. (2017), 'Eliciting strategies in indefinitely repeated games of strategic substitutes and complements', Working Paper.Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. (2002), 'Why social preferences matter - the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives', The Economic Journal 112(478), 1-33.Friedman, J. W. (1971), 'A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames', Review of Economic Studies 38, 1-12.Kandori, M. (1992), 'Social norms and community enforcement', Review of Economic Studies 59, 63-80.

大量的社会经济现象要求当个人利益和群体利益不一致时，个人愿意合作，我们如何在无限重复的社会困境中维持长期合作的问题一直是行为经济学的基本主题之一。该项目考虑了举报-一种关键的集中惩罚制度-对违反规范行为的制裁依赖于观察违反规范行为的中央监测员，结果是对被举报者直接罚款。在现实生活中，集中惩罚制度并不少见。例如，当人们开快车时，货币制裁来自中央权力机构-例如，建议的研究方案旨在解决以下研究问题：建议问题1：为了维持合作规范，个人对举报的代价有多敏感？RQ 2：在存在举报机会的情况下，参与者会采取哪些策略？建议问题3：在考虑非货币（无成本）举报与货币（成本高）举报时，如何确定合作规范？最近的实验通过实施引发玩家的策略来解释行为（参见Dal Bo & Frechette（2019）和Embrey，Mengel & Peeters（2017））。这两篇论文都发现，大多数受试者依赖于“总是背叛”（静态纳什）、达特和冷酷触发等策略。从理论上讲，合作也可能是长期互动中的一种均衡（例如，参见Friedman（1971）的无限重复框架的民间定理以及Kandori（1992）和Ellison（1994）的后续随机匹配扩展。鉴于相互合作在理论上是一种均衡，实验证据表明，合作可能不会发生在陌生人或合作伙伴之间（Camera & Casari（2009）; Dal Bo & Frechette（2011）），这就提出了一个问题，即在存在举报的情况下，参与者会采取什么策略。具体来说，有必要界定哪些行为对社区不利，以及对举报人的罚款的确切数额。现有的证据表明，个人关心他人以及他人对自己的看法（参见Fehr & Fischbacher（2002）的总结），因此，我们提出了以下两个假设：假设1：一个不可忽略的部分的受试者会揭发他人，即使揭发是昂贵的。假设2：举报将加强合作规范，高昂的成本将阻止举报人举报不法行为。& Casari，M.（2009），“未来阴影下的陌生人之间的合作”，美国经济评论99（3），979-1005。Dal Bo，P. & Frechette，G.（2019），“战略选择在不断重复的囚徒困境”，美国经济评论109（11），3929-3952。Dal Bo，P. & Frechette，G.（2011），“合作在无限重复游戏的演变：实验证据”，美国经济评论101，411-429。Ellison，G.（1994），“合作在囚犯的困境与匿名随机匹配”，经济研究评论61，567- 588。Mengel，F. & Peeters，R.（2017），“在无限期重复的战略替代和补充博弈中引发战略”，工作论文。& Fischbacher，U.（2002），“为什么社会偏好重要-非自私动机对竞争，合作和激励的影响”，经济学杂志112（478），1- 33。（1971），“超级博弈的非合作均衡”，经济研究评论38，1- 12.（1992），“社会规范和社区执法”，经济研究评论59，63-80。