Changing the Face of Corruption: Audits, Substitution Between Forms of Corruption, and Public Sector Performance

一些政府试图通过审计来遏制腐败。然而，审计不可避免地会更好地揭示某些形式的腐败，而腐败官员可以适应。因此，审计是否会系统地增加它们没有揭露的腐败形式的发生率？如果是这样，这种增长会产生永久的福利后果吗？这个研究项目解决了这些问题的经验。为了做到这一点，它利用了巴西的一项反腐败计划，该计划在2003年至2015年期间随机选择了数千个地方政府进行审计。虽然该计划成功地揭露了某些形式的腐败，但它没有揭露裙带关系的做法。为了衡量这一替代形式的腐败在一段时间内的系统发生率，该项目使用了关于巴西未经竞争性公务员考试雇用的市长和公共部门雇员的全部全名的信息，用姓氏来确定家庭关系。然后，该项目测试裙带关系的发生率是否在被审计的城市中系统地和永久地更高。为了调查对社会福利的影响，该项目调查审计是否通过诱导裙带关系雇用的官僚增加而永久性地降低官僚机构的质量（以教育、私营部门收入和技能衡量）及其绩效（以提供关键公共服务的质量衡量，如教育）。

Several governments have tried to curb corruption via audits. However, audits inevitably reveal some forms of corruption better than others, and corrupt officials can adapt. Thus, could audits systematically increase the incidence of forms of corruption they do not reveal? If so, could this increase have permanent welfare consequences? This research project addresses these questions empirically. To do so, it exploits a Brazilian anti-corruption program which randomly selected thousands of local governments to be audited between 2003 and 2015. While this program successfully uncovered some forms of corruption, it did not uncover nepotistic practices. To measure the systematic incidence of this alternative form of corruption over time, this project uses information on the full names of the universe of mayors and public sector employees hired without a competitive civil service examination in Brazil, using surnames to identify family connections. The project then tests whether the incidence of nepotism is systematically - and permanently - greater in audited municipalities. To investigate implications for society's welfare, the project investigates whether audits, by inducing an increase in nepotistically hired bureaucrats, permanently reduce the quality of the bureaucracy (as measured by education, private sector earnings and skill)and its performance (as measured by the quality of provision of key public services, like education).