Optimal Persuasion with Imitating Receivers

欧盟委员会早就为农产品和食品建立了地理标志。这一计划旨在为因原产地而具有独特特征的优质产品赋予独特的标志。作为健康和营养饮食的最佳表达，地理标志应该为买家提供有说服力的线索，最终影响他们的日常购物。如果消费者理性地选择食物以最大化他们的生存机会，这将是正确的。然而，由于营养不良正在上升，消费者对欧盟质量标签的认识仍然很低，我提出以下问题：如果购买者不理性，地理标志真的有价值吗？如果没有，如何调整现行政策以促进这一点？在这种情况下，我考虑非理性的一种特殊形式：模仿。我之所以选择这种心理现象，是因为它在消费者研究中的重要性。在整个过程中，我使用理论经济学的工具来定义模仿和理解其对最佳说服theorety.This研究的影响是政策相关的i）提高消费者对欧盟质量计划的认识和ii）引导系统范围内的变化，在包装前标签的建议。这一贡献将在促进向更可持续的粮食选择过渡的关键时刻到来。

The European Commission has long established Geographical Indications (GIs) for agricultural commodities and foodstuff. This scheme aims to attribute distinctive marks to products of exceptional quality, whose unique characteristics are due to their place of origin. As the best expression of a healthy and nutritious diet, GIs should provide buyers with persuasive cues that ultimately affect their daily shopping. This would be true if consumers chose foods rationally tomaximise their chances of survival. However, since malnutrition is on the rise and consumers' awareness of EU quality labels remains low, I ask the following: are GIs truly valuable if buyers are not rational? If not, how can current policies be adapted to promote it? In this case, I consider a specific form of non-rationality: imitation. I choose this psychological phenomenon because of its importance in consumer research. Throughout, I use tools of theoretical economics to defineimitation and understand its impact on optimal persuasion theory.This study is policy-relevant for i) increasing consumers' awareness of EU Quality Schemes and for ii) steering system-wide changes in front-of-pack labelling proposals. Such a contribution would come ata critical time for promoting a transition to more sustainable food choices.