The Moral Foundations of Family Law

家庭法的道德基础

• 批准号: 2753794
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Cambridge
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2022 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2753794
• 关键词: Moral; Foundations; Family; Law

The legal regulation of the family must have a principled basis. If no principled basis is available, then such regulation is illegitimate. Traditionally, family law assumed a moral conception of the family based on heterosexual marriage and thepatriarchal dominion of the husband over his wife and children. This moral conception is no longer acceptable, and therefore cannot provide the required principled basis. One response is to seek a morally neutral justification for familylaw. I call this position 'Neutralism'. In my research I will argue that Neutralism is misconceived. I will explore an alternative to Neutralism that I call 'Connectivism'. Connectivism asserts that the legitimate regulation of the familynecessarily depends upon the existence of moral obligations that are owed between family members. I will develop Connectivism by drawing upon the philosophical concept of 'special obligations' and its accompanying literature. I willthen argue that a central debate in family law scholarship - about the legal consequences that should flow from de facto relationships - is best understood as a dispute between different versions of Connectivism. My research will explorewhether Connectivism can provide family law with a principled foundation, while also illuminating a central debate in family law and policy.

对家庭的法律规定必须有一个原则基础。如果没有原则基础，那么这样的规定是不合法的。传统上，家庭法假设了一种基于异性婚姻和丈夫对妻子和孩子的父权统治的家庭道德观念。这种道德观念已不再被接受，因此不能提供所需的原则基础。一种回应是为家庭法寻找道德中立的理由。我把这种立场称为“中立主义”。在我的研究中，我认为中立主义是错误的。我将探索中立主义的另一种选择，我称之为“联系主义”。联结主义断言，家庭的合法管理必然依赖于家庭成员之间存在的道德义务。我将通过借鉴“特殊义务”的哲学概念及其相关文献来发展联系主义。然后，我将论证，家庭法学术界的一个核心争论——关于事实上的关系应该产生的法律后果——最好理解为不同版本的联系主义之间的争论。我的研究将探讨连接主义是否可以为家庭法提供一个原则性的基础，同时也阐明了家庭法和政策的核心辩论。