State collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland 1968-98

本研究将探讨1968-98年冲突期间北爱尔兰安全部队和保皇派准军事组织之间的勾结。它将考虑通过殖民时期的平叛经验而制定的平叛战略的重要性，并将解决一个有争议的问题，即共谋是高级政治家默许的广泛战略的一部分，还是安全部队中少数“坏苹果”行动的结果。利用来自档案、二手资料和访谈的文件，它将对信息进行三角测量，以调查个人行为和正式阴谋之间复杂的灰色地带。

This research will explore collusion between the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland during the 1968-98 conflict. It will consider the significance of counterinsurgency strategies developed through experience of colonial counterinsurgency, and will address the controversial question of whether collusion was part of a widespread strategy tacitly approved by senior politicians, or the result of the actions of a few 'bad apples' within the security forces. Using documents from archives, secondary sources, and interviews, it will triangulate information to investigate the complex grey area between individual actions and formal conspiracy.