Conceptualizing Individual Moral Obligation: A Case for Collectively Insignificant Outcomes

在这篇论文中，我认为，与朱莉娅·内夫斯基相反的是，“集体伤害问题”超越了错误的假设，揭示了个人义务在道德上相关的行为方式的糟糕概念化，而不管集体无关紧要的结果。我的目标是，除其他事项外，为什么集体无关紧要的行动的压倒一切的原则最能受到个人道德义务的激励--以下简称“国际海事组织”--被概念化为共同利益所必需的“非集体基本义务”。有各种关于集体伤害案件的叙述(Parfit 1984；Nefsky 2017、2019、2012a、2012b；Kutz 2000；Cripps 2011)，以及集体和个人义务/责任案件(1970年举行；Collins and de Haan 2021；Collins 2017,2020)。Nefsky(2017：2744)将集体无关紧要的行动的有见地的案例说成是“集体伤害问题”，把集体无关紧要的行动的案例说成是“集体影响的案例”。根据Nefsky(2019：1)的说法，“集体伤害”是指“当有足够多的人采取某种方式造成严重伤害，但似乎没有任何相关的个人行为本身产生影响时”。集体伤害案件中的问题抓住了“我们共同带来可避免的伤害的风险”(Nefsky 2019：10)，通过采取道德上有害的行动或拒绝以道德相关的方式采取行动，因为相信集体地，我们单一的善行不会产生任何影响。在某种程度上，这免除了我们单一的有害行为的道德责任，因为我们没有‘道德上相关的理由’去做相反的事情。这一观点也可称为无效果观点(见SInnott-Armstrong 2005)。内夫斯基认为这种思考问题的方式是错误的。对于奈夫斯基(2019：10)来说，我们的单一行动“太小而不能改变结果本身并不意味着不能朝着不同的结果迈出非多余的一步。”因此，涅夫斯基的立场是肯定单一行为在带来结果方面的相关性，即使它不能共同产生影响。然而，这种对集体伤害案件的思维方式有何不妥？作为个人，有没有理由以道德相关的方式行事，而不考虑集体无关紧要的结果？如果是，那么采取行动的最好理由是什么？有意识地采取某种方式导致道德上有害的结果有什么不对吗？此外，如果我们为集体伤害尽了自己的一份力，那么，是什么让为集体解决方案做出贡献的努力在道德上无关紧要呢？最重要的，也是这项研究的核心，海事组织在集体影响案例中的地位是什么？海事组织能否为集体无关紧要的结果提供更好的动力或基础？这项研究将试图参与并为这些相关问题提供合理的答案。

In this thesis, I argue, contra Julia Nefsky, that the 'problem of collective harm' goes beyond a mistaken assumption to reveal a poor conceptualization of individual obligation to act in morally relevant ways, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes. I aim to establish among other things, why the overriding principle for collectively insignificant actions can best be motivated by individual moral obligation - hereafter 'IMO' - conceptualized as a 'non-collective fundamental duty' necessary for the common good. There are various accounts of collective harm cases (Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017, 2019, 2012a, 2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011), as well as collective and individual-obligation/responsibility cases (Held 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2017, 2020). Nefsky (2017: 2744) articulates an insightful case of collectively insignificant actions as 'the problem of collective harm' and the cases of collectively insignificant actions as "collective impact cases. According to Nefsky (2019: 1), 'collective harm' arises in cases where "when enough people act in a certain sort of way serious harm results, and yet no individual act of the relevant sort seems to itself make a difference." The issue in collective harm cases captures "the risk of our together bringing about avoidable harm" (Nefsky 2019: 10) by taking a morally harmful course of action or refusing to act in a morally relevant way because of the belief that collectively, our singular good acts will make no difference. This, in some way, absolves our singular harmful actions of moral responsibility as we have no 'morally relevant reason' to act otherwise. This view can also be referred to as the no-effect view (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Nefsky thinks this way of thinking about the problem is mistaken. For Nefsky (2019: 10), our singular actions "[b]eing too small to change the outcome by itself does not mean being unable to make a non-superfluous move toward a different outcome." Consequently, Nefsky takes a position that affirms the relevance of singular acts in bringing about an outcome, even if it fails to make a difference collectively. However, what is wrong with this way of thinking about collective harm cases? Is there a reason for acting in a morally relevant way as individuals, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes? If yes, what is the best justification for acting anyway? Is there anything wrong with consciously acting in a way that contributes to a morally harmful outcome? Also, if we do our part to contribute to collective harm, then what makes doing our part to contribute to a collective solution morally insignificant? Most importantly and central to this research, what is the place of IMO in collective impact cases? Can IMO provide a better motivation or grounding for collectively insignificant outcomes? This research will attempt to engage and provide defensible answers to these relevant questions.