Conceptualizing Individual Moral Obligation: A Case for Collectively Insignificant Outcomes

个人道德义务的概念化：集体结果微不足道的案例

• 批准号: 2886157
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Manchester
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2023 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2886157
• 关键词: Conceptualizing; Individual; Moral; Obligation; Case

In this thesis, I argue, contra Julia Nefsky, that the 'problem of collective harm' goes beyond a mistaken assumption to reveal a poor conceptualization of individual obligation to act in morally relevant ways, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes. I aim to establish among other things, why the overriding principle for collectively insignificant actions can best be motivated by individual moral obligation - hereafter 'IMO' - conceptualized as a 'non-collective fundamental duty' necessary for the common good. There are various accounts of collective harm cases (Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017, 2019, 2012a, 2012b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011), as well as collective and individual-obligation/responsibility cases (Held 1970; Collins and de Haan 2021; Collins 2017, 2020). Nefsky (2017: 2744) articulates an insightful case of collectively insignificant actions as 'the problem of collective harm' and the cases of collectively insignificant actions as "collective impact cases. According to Nefsky (2019: 1), 'collective harm' arises in cases where "when enough people act in a certain sort of way serious harm results, and yet no individual act of the relevant sort seems to itself make a difference." The issue in collective harm cases captures "the risk of our together bringing about avoidable harm" (Nefsky 2019: 10) by taking a morally harmful course of action or refusing to act in a morally relevant way because of the belief that collectively, our singular good acts will make no difference. This, in some way, absolves our singular harmful actions of moral responsibility as we have no 'morally relevant reason' to act otherwise. This view can also be referred to as the no-effect view (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). Nefsky thinks this way of thinking about the problem is mistaken. For Nefsky (2019: 10), our singular actions "[b]eing too small to change the outcome by itself does not mean being unable to make a non-superfluous move toward a different outcome." Consequently, Nefsky takes a position that affirms the relevance of singular acts in bringing about an outcome, even if it fails to make a difference collectively. However, what is wrong with this way of thinking about collective harm cases? Is there a reason for acting in a morally relevant way as individuals, regardless of collectively insignificant outcomes? If yes, what is the best justification for acting anyway? Is there anything wrong with consciously acting in a way that contributes to a morally harmful outcome? Also, if we do our part to contribute to collective harm, then what makes doing our part to contribute to a collective solution morally insignificant? Most importantly and central to this research, what is the place of IMO in collective impact cases? Can IMO provide a better motivation or grounding for collectively insignificant outcomes? This research will attempt to engage and provide defensible answers to these relevant questions.

在这篇论文中，我认为，反对朱莉娅Nefsky，“集体伤害的问题”超越了一个错误的假设，揭示了一个穷人的概念化的个人义务，以道德相关的方式行事，无论集体微不足道的结果。我的目标是建立除其他事项外，为什么压倒一切的原则，集体微不足道的行动可以最好地由个人的道德义务-以下简称“IMO”-概念化为一个“非集体的基本义务”，为共同利益所必需的动机。关于集体伤害案例（Parfit 1984; Nefsky 2017，2019，2012 a，2012 b; Kutz 2000; Cripps 2011）以及集体和个人义务/责任案例（Held 1970;柯林斯and de哈安2021;柯林斯2017，2020），有各种各样的描述。内夫斯基（2017年：2744）阐明了一个有见地的情况下，集体无关紧要的行动作为“问题的集体伤害”和案件的集体无关紧要的行动作为“集体影响的情况。根据Nefsky（2019：1）的说法，“集体伤害”出现在“当足够多的人以某种方式行事时，会造成严重的伤害，但相关的个人行为本身似乎没有产生影响。集体伤害案件中的问题抓住了“我们共同带来可避免的伤害的风险”（Nefsky 2019：10），通过采取道德上有害的行动或拒绝以道德上相关的方式行事，因为相信集体，我们的单一良好行为不会有什么不同。在某种程度上，这免除了我们道德责任的单一有害行为，因为我们没有“道德相关的理由”采取其他行动。这种观点也可以被称为无效观点（参见Sinnott-Armstrong 2005）。Nefsky认为这种思考问题的方式是错误的。对于Nefsky（2019年：10），我们的单一行动“[B]太小，不能改变结果本身并不意味着不能作出一个非多余的走向不同的结果。“因此，Nefsky采取了一种立场，即肯定单一行为在产生结果方面的相关性，即使它不能集体地产生影响。然而，这种对集体伤害案件的思考方式有什么错呢？作为个体，是否有理由以道德上相关的方式行事，而不管集体上微不足道的结果？如果是的话，采取行动的最佳理由是什么？有意识地以一种导致道德上有害的结果的方式行事有什么错吗？此外，如果我们尽自己的一份力量造成集体伤害，那么，什么使我们尽自己的一份力量促进集体解决方案在道德上无足轻重？最重要的是，这项研究的核心是，海事组织在集体影响案件中的地位是什么？海事组织能否为集体意义不大的结果提供更好的动机或基础？本研究将试图参与并提供这些相关问题的合理答案。