Approximate Truths: A New Ground for the Pillars of Scientific Realism

在科学实在论的辩论中，近似真理（AT）的作用似乎相当边缘化，特别是考虑到AT经常被描述为真理的替代品这一事实。相反，我的项目将重新思考AT对科学实在论至关重要的作用，并将表明AT不应该仅仅被概念化为真理的替代品，而是作为一种复杂的现象，将提供定性的解释。首先，我将批判性地评估这个概念在当代科学哲学中的历史。一方面，在科学实在论的传统争论中出现了对真理逼近概念的反思；另一方面，还有另一种与真理相似概念有关的反思流，通常是通过形式方法进行的。尽管如此，我将证明这两种争论之间的部分和解是可能的：两者都承认近似真理涉及错误的信念——即使这是有争议的——并且认为近似真理（或真理相似）是证明科学实在论的关键。在考虑到这一共同点之后，我将分析这段历史所显示的真理与AT之间的动态关系。事实上，AT可以被看作是在审视真理的对应理论和现实主义的其他核心原则，如形而上学的论点，即“世界有一个确定的、独立于心灵的自然类结构”，以及语义立场，根据这种立场，理论是“对其预期领域的真理条件描述，包括可观察的和不可观察的”。例如，波普尔在赞同塔斯基的真理理论的同时，引入了对真理的整体理解，以证明他对真实性的解释是正确的；同样地，博伊德挑战了塔斯基对真理的解释，以便为近似在科学中的作用腾出空间，并专注于可以被认为是近似的一种更激进的形式：不确定性。根据这些考虑，我将论证存在一种真理近似感，在这种近似感中，后者并不仅仅作为替代物起作用，因为没有最终真理作为基准。因此，借鉴泰勒的观点，我将介绍一个定性的、多维的近似概念有可能质疑现实主义的基本原则，并建立一个更温和的立场。随后，我将从一个特定的观点，即自然种类的观点来分析近似真理的问题——这被认为是现实主义者和反现实主义者之间争论的最重要的战场之一。我将考虑从自然种类和近似真理的概念之间的交叉产生的问题，特别是边界情况的问题。根据之前的观察，并借鉴其他现实主义作家的观点，我将试图弱化自然种类对现实主义事业的重要性。最后，我将考虑近似真理与现实主义的最新发展之间的关系，这可以被视为解决许多传统主义的问题。我将考虑现实主义最近的“实用主义转向”，因为真理的概念在不同的现实主义作家中对有意因素变得越来越敏感，从而吸收了传统主义的见解。我的论点是，这些传统主义的元素可以用近似真理来重新表述，因此，这些更新的现实主义形式可以受益于本文前面提出的对真理近似的更强强调。假设是，诉诸于精神病学哲学中使用的“罗氏概念”、“范例”和类似的类别，它们对真理近似现象更敏感，可能有助于建立适度形式的现实主义。

The role of approximate truth (AT) seems quite marginal to the scientific realism debate, especially in light of the fact that AT has often been depicted as a truth surrogate. To the contrary, my project will rethink the role of AT as essential to scientific realism, and will show that AT shouldn't be conceptualized as a truth surrogate only, but as a complex phenomenon of which a qualitative account will be provided. First, I will critically assess the history of the concept in contemporary philosophy of science. On the one hand, there have been reflections on the concept of truth approximation emerging from the traditional debate on scientific realism; on the other, there is another stream of reflections associated with the concept of truthlikeness, often carried out through formal methods. Still, I will show that a partial reconciliation between these two debates is possible: both acknowledge that approximate truth involves false beliefs - even if this is disputable - and consider approximate truth (or truthlikeness) as pivotal to justify scientific realism. After considering this common ground, I will analyze the dynamic relationship between truth and AT that this history displays. As a matter of fact, AT can be seen as putting under scrutiny the correspondence theory of truth and other core tenets of realism, such as the metaphysical thesis, namely the idea that 'the world has a definite and mind-independent natural-kind structure', and the semantic stance, according to which theories are 'truth-conditioned descriptions of their intended domain, both observable and unobservable'. For instance, while sympathizing with Tarski's theory of truth, Popper introduced a holistic understanding of truth in order to justify his account of verisimilitude; similarly, Boyd challenged Tarski's account of truth in order to make room for the role of approximation in science, and dwelled on what can be considered as a more radical form of approximation: indeterminacy. In light of these considerations, I will argue that there is a sense of truth approximation in which the latter does not work as a mere surrogate, inasmuch there is no final truth working as a benchmark. Therefore, drawing from Teller, I will introduce the idea that a qualitative, multidimensional concept of approximation has the potential to question the basic tenets of realism and ground a more modest position. Subsequently, I will analyze the problem of approximate truth from a particular viewpoint, that of natural kinds - which is considered one of the most important battlegrounds for the dispute between realists and antirealists. I will consider the problems that stem from the intersection between the concepts of natural kinds and approximate truth, and in particular the issue of borderline cases. In light of the previous observations, and by drawing from other realist authors, I will try to deflate the importance of natural kinds for the realist's cause.Finally, I will consider the relationship between approximate truth and the more recent developments of realism, which can be seen as addressing many conventionalist concerns. I will take into account what can be considered the recent "pragmatist turn" of realism, as the concept of truth has become increasingly more sensitive to intentional factors in different realist authors, thus absorbing conventionalist insights. My contention is that these conventionalist elements could be rephrased in terms of approximate truth and that these renewed forms of realism could therefore benefit from a stronger emphasis on truth approximation as presented earlier in the thesis. The hypothesis is that resorting to "Roschian concepts", "exemplars" and similar categories used in the philosophy of psychiatry, which are more sensitive to the phenomenon of truth approximation, might be useful to ground modest forms of realism.