Internalism, Externalism and Truth-conditions

在哲学中，有一种基本的分歧，即内在主义者（主张意义问题只能通过诉诸施事-内部特征来解决）和外在主义者（主张意义需要词-世界关系）。这种分歧出现在某些意义理论的动机（内在主义）和这些理论的本质（外在主义）之间的明显紧张关系中。在我的作品中，我探讨了这种紧张关系，认为在最近的许多辩论中，它被误解了。相反，我认为，内在主义和外在主义的观点的理论化的角度来看，在这种情况下，可以被带到连贯。

There is a fundamental division in philosophy between those who adopt an internalist perspective on content (claiming that questions of meaning can be addressed solely via appeal to agent-internal features) and externalist (who claim that a meaning requires word-world relations). This division emerges in the apparent tension between the motivations for certain theories of meaning (which are internalist) and the essential nature of those theories (which is externalist). In my work I explore the tension, arguing that in many recent debates it has been misconstrued. Instead I suggest that internalist and externalist perspective perspectives on theorising can, in this instance, be brought to cohere.