Clouds of October: Nuclear Weapons, Counterfactuals, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

历史学家普遍认为，1962年10月发生的事件是人类最接近热核战争的时刻。古巴导弹危机（西方称之为古巴导弹危机）是任何关于核危机和危机管理的讨论的参考点。1962年10月通常被视为冷战和苏美缓和和军备控制发展的转折点。最近对这场危机的研究揭示了在政治领导人不知情的情况下可能使用核武器的各种事件。对组织和认知因素的更深入了解，有助于挑战有关核稳定性和安全的乐观假设。该项目提供了一个系统的探索场景，通知或最近的启示产生。如果核武器是有意使用、意外使用或由未经授权的下属使用，那么政治（或军事）领导人将面临报复和升级的决定。他们的行为方式和后果是这项研究的核心。如果不考察核战争的危险，更重要的是，不考察核战争将或可能意味着什么，我们就不能正确地理解1962年的事件。关于导弹危机的文献是广泛的，在过去的二十年中，已经产生了对苏联和美国决策的理解和辩论（以及其他欧洲和拉丁美洲参与者）。学术研究既集中在高层政策制定上，也集中在业务层面上。对于危机中决策者知之甚少或一无所知的方面，现在已经有了很多了解。人们早就认识到，1962年的战争风险源于误解、误判、错误和不幸的潜在叠加。我们现在有相当多的证据证明这种误解、误判和错误。该项目借鉴了这些文献以及核历史和核战略方面的相关研究。这本书的方法论是基于对反事实的系统和批判的使用。所有的历史学家都使用反事实，一些学者用这种方法研究了1962年10月核战争的风险。《十月风云》通过对危机每个阶段的情景进行批判性评估，系统地做到了这一点。这些场景是通过调整已知情境中的一个偶然元素而设计的。在调整一个因果变量的情况下，尽可能地应用所谓的“最小重写历史”规则。此外，只有通过反事实推理，我们才能探索如果越过核门槛，决策者面临核报复和核升级的选择，会发生什么。在战略研究领域，反事实确实是思考核武器使用问题的核心。关于导弹危机的文献只是偶尔涉及决策者如何应对使用核武器的问题，尽管这对于理解1962年军事对抗的风险和危险至关重要。这场危机的和平解决被认为是理所当然的，西方公众对核战争的风险不敏感。该项目的目的是批判性地评估核战争是否可能在1962年发生，以及它是否有可能产生的后果。

The events of October 1962 are generally agreed by historians to be the closest humankind has come to thermo-nuclear war. The Cuban missile crisis (as it is called in the West) is a reference point in any discussion of nuclear crises and crisis management. October 1962 is commonly seen as a turning point in the Cold War and the development of Soviet­ American detente and arms control. Recent research on the crisis has revealed various incidents where nuclear weapons might have been used when political leaders were unaware of what was happening. Greater understanding of organisational and cognitive factors has helped challenge sanguine assumptions about nuclear stability and safety. The project provides a systematic exploration of scenarios, informed or generated by recent revelations. Had nuclear weapons been used by design, by accident or by unauthorised subordinates then political (or military) leaders would have faced decisions about retaliation and escalation. How they might have acted and with what consequences are central to the study. We cannot properly understand the events of 1962 without examination of the risk of nuclear war and moreover, what nuclear war would or could have meant. The literature on the Missile Crisis is extensive and in the last two decades has generated understanding and debate about Soviet and American decision-making (as well as about other European and Latin American participants). Academic enquiry has focused both on high-level policy making and on the operational level. A great deal is now known about aspects of the crisis of which decision-makers knew little or nothing. It has long been recognised that the risk of war in 1962 arose from a potential concatenation of misperceptions, miscalculations, mistakes and misfortune. We now have considerable evidence of such misperceptions, miscalculations and mistakes.The project draws upon this literature as well as cognate studies in nuclear history and nuclear strategy. The methodology of the book is based on systematic and critical use of counterfactuals. All historians use counterfactuals and several scholars have examined the risk of nuclear war in October 1962 in this way. 'Clouds of October' does this systematically by critically evaluating scenarios at each stage of the crisis. These scenarios are devised by adjusting one casual element in what is known about a given situation. What is termed the 'minimum-rewrite-of history' rule is applied as far as possible, where one causal variable is adjusted. Moreover, it is only by means of counterfactual reasoning that we can explore what would have happened if the nuclear threshold had been crossed and decision-makers faced choices about nuclear retaliation and escalation. Counterfactuals are indeed at the heart of thinking about the use of nuclear weapons in the field of strategic studies. The literature on the missile crisis deals only occasionally with the question of how decision-makers would have responded to the use of nuclear weapons, even though this is crucial to understanding the risks and dangers of military confrontation in 1962. The peaceful resolution of the crisis has been taken for granted and western publics desensitised to the risk of nuclear war. The aim of the project is to critically evaluate whether nuclear war could have happened in 1962, and if it had what might have been the consequences.