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Design and protection strategies for critical infrastructure systems and supply chains

关键基础设施系统和供应链的设计和保护策略

基本信息

批准号：
EP/E048552/1
负责人：
Maria Scaparra
金额：
$ 22.54万
依托单位：
University of Kent
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2007
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2007 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=EP%2FE048552%2F1
关键词：
Design protection strategies critical infrastructure

项目摘要

Infrastructure systems and supply chains are at the basis of societal functions and reach into every aspect of modern life. Examples of these vital systems include goods and service distribution networks, emergency services, financial services, transportation and telecommunication networks, electrical power grids and water supply systems among others. Unfortunately, recent world events have demonstrated that even the strongest supply chains or infrastructure systems can be extremely vulnerable to unforeseen events. The World Trade Centre terrorist attack in 2001, the Tsunami in December 2004, and hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which hit the US gulf coast in 2005, are only the most dramatic evidence of the precariousness and vulnerability of our critical infrastructure to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Other less catastrophic but more frequent incidents, such as plant fires, industrial accidents, labor strikes and power outages, can also have costly and, sometimes, harmful implications, especially if the incapacitated or destroyed supply line provides essential services or goods (e.g., hospitals, drugs, vaccines).In view of all these risks and hazards, there has been a heightened awareness and concern over the past few years for increasing the security and reliability of infrastructure and supply systems that may be subject to potential external disruptions. Planning against possible disruptive acts of nature or terrorism is an enormous financial and logistical challenge, especially if one considers the scale and complexity of today's logistic systems, the increasing interdependence among numerous system elements, the variety of threats and hazards, and the prohibitive costs involved in securing large numbers of system components. Since it is generally impossible to secure all assets, it is important to devise systematic approaches for identifying critical elements, optimize the protection of key system components and even build new systems which are inherently robust. Optimization techniques can play a significant role in this respect.Over the last few years, a few optimization models have been developed for identifying supply chain configurations that are both reliable with respect to disruptions and economically cost-effective in terms of infrastructure investment (design models). Additionally, new models have been proposed recently which can be used to improve the reliability of infrastructure systems that are already in place and for which a complete reconfiguration would be too costly (protection models).The overall objective of this project is to develop a suite of new optimization models in both of these reliability-related research areas. In particular, new modeling approaches will be developed to overcome some of the overly simplified assumptions which characterize existing models, to capture additional complex issues arising in systems reliability planning, and to reflect the diversity of possible application settings. As an example, future modeling efforts should aim at incorporating various combinations of the following issues: (1) different operational protocols of the systems (cost-based vs. standards-based supply models); (2) different types of hazards (expected models for natural disasters vs. worst-case models for premeditated attacks); (3) different underlying models (facility location, network, multi-echelon supply models); (4) stochastic aspects such as random numbers of possible losses and component-specific failure probabilities; (5) different degrees of facility protection (protected components may be completely immune to attacks and failures, have a lower probability of being disrupted, or preserve part of their operational capabilities depending on the level of protection investment); (6) multiple objectives (operational costs, lost-sales cost, system efficiency, coverage, risk level). Both exact and heuristic techniques will also be developed to solve the newly proposed models.

基础设施系统和供应链是社会功能的基础，并深入到现代生活的方方面面。这些重要系统的例子包括货物和服务分配网络、紧急服务、金融服务、运输和电信网络、电网和供水系统等。不幸的是，最近的世界事件表明，即使是最强大的供应链或基础设施系统也可能极易受到意外事件的影响。2001年的世界贸易中心恐怖袭击、2004年12月的海啸以及2005年袭击美国墨西哥湾沿岸的卡特里娜飓风和丽塔飓风，只是我们的关键基础设施在自然灾害和恐怖袭击面前岌岌可危和脆弱的最戏剧性的证据。其他不那么灾难性但更频繁的事件，如工厂火灾、工业事故、劳工罢工和停电，也可能产生代价高昂、有时有害的影响，特别是如果失去能力或被摧毁的供应线提供基本服务或货物(如医院、药品、疫苗)。鉴于所有这些风险和危险，过去几年人们对提高可能受到潜在外部干扰的基础设施和供应系统的安全性和可靠性的认识和关注有所提高。规划应对可能的自然或恐怖主义破坏行为是一项巨大的财务和后勤挑战，特别是如果考虑到当今物流系统的规模和复杂性、众多系统要素之间日益相互依存的关系、各种威胁和危险以及确保大量系统部件安全所涉及的高昂成本。由于通常不可能确保所有资产的安全，因此必须制定系统的办法来确定关键要素，优化对关键系统组成部分的保护，甚至建立本质上稳健的新系统。优化技术在这方面可以发挥重要的作用。在过去的几年里，已经开发了一些优化模型来确定在中断方面可靠且在基础设施投资(设计模型)方面具有经济成本效益的供应链配置。此外，最近还提出了新的模型，这些模型可用于提高已经存在的基础设施系统的可靠性，而对于这些基础设施系统来说，完全重新配置的成本太高(保护模型)。该项目的总体目标是在这两个与可靠性相关的研究领域开发一套新的优化模型。特别是，将开发新的建模方法，以克服现有模型的一些过于简化的假设，以捕捉系统可靠性规划中出现的额外复杂问题，并反映可能的应用环境的多样性。例如，未来的建模工作应着眼于纳入以下问题的不同组合：(1)系统的不同业务协议(基于成本的供应模型与基于标准的供应模型)；(2)不同类型的危险(自然灾害的预期模型与预谋袭击的最坏情况模型)；(3)不同的基本模型(设施位置、网络、多层供应模型)；(4)随机方面，例如可能损失的随机数字和特定部件的故障概率；(5)不同程度的设施保护(受保护组件可能完全不受攻击和故障的影响，被中断的可能性较低，或根据保护投资的水平保留部分运行能力)；(6)多目标(运行成本、销售损失成本、系统效率、覆盖范围、风险水平)。还将开发精确和启发式技术来求解新提出的模型。