Cognitive factors that impact the development of episodic future thinking

成年人不断地思考未来，这些想法从平凡的（例如，“我今天午餐吃什么”）到更有意义的（例如，“我退休了怎么办？").这种在心理上预先体验未来的能力被称为“情景未来思维”，可以被认为是情景记忆的未来导向补充，或者是在心理上重新体验过去。虽然儿童思考未来的能力被认为是计划和延迟满足等适应行为的基础，但直到最近，研究人员才开始设计测试其发展的方法。我们现在知道，情景式未来思维在3岁到5岁之间发展得很好，但我们对影响它的因素知之甚少，确定这些因素是我研究计划的第一个主要目标。因此，在第一组研究中，我将探讨儿童是否能够将有关干预事件和时间偶然性的信息纳入他们对未来的推理中。例如，成年人可能会将她最喜欢的饼干藏在壁橱里，而不是藏在他们习惯的位置（例如，因为她预计其他人可能会发现他们和吃他们之前，她得到他们下一个。我的第一组研究要解决的具体问题之一是，幼儿在推理未来时是否也考虑到了这些潜在的干预事件。在第二组研究中，我将考察在心理上投射自我到未来的认知机制是否与在心理上投射另一个人的未来的认知机制不同。这个问题在理论上是重要的，因为就其本质而言，情节性未来思维被定义为对自己未来的预先体验。因此，我们会期望人们--包括幼儿--对自我和他人做出这种投射的方式有所不同。本研究计划的最终目标是检查儿童在本提案中使用的情景未来思维的各种任务上的表现是否与其他高阶认知过程有关，包括心理理论（或“心理状态推理”）和执行功能（一组认知能力，允许个人解决问题或实现目标），这些能力也在3岁至5岁之间发展。我提出的研究将阐明影响儿童未来思维准确性的因素，从而有助于告知父母和照顾者儿童可能在推理未来时遇到特别困难的情况。它还将有助于完善关于情景性未来思维的定义特征的理论，并将对优化整个生命周期的未来思维和减轻人们参与具有负面未来后果的行为的倾向（例如，不为退休储蓄）。

Adults think about the future constantly, with these thoughts ranging from the mundane (e.g., "What will have I have for lunch today") to the more meaningful (e.g., "What will I do once I retire?"). This ability to mentally pre-experience the future has been termed "episodic future thinking," and can be conceived as the future-oriented complement to episodic memory or, mentally re-experiencing the past. Although children's capacity to think about the future is argued to be fundamental to such adaptive behaviours as planning and delaying gratification, it is only recently that researchers have begun to design methods to test its development. We now know that episodic future thinking develops substantially between ages 3 and 5, but we know very little about the factors that impact it. Identifying such factors is the first major goal of my research program. Accordingly, in a first set of studies, I will explore whether children can incorporate information about intervening events and temporal contingencies into their reasoning about the future. For example, an adult may hide her favorite cookies in the closet rather than in their customary location (e.g., cupboard) because she anticipates that someone else may find them and eat them before she gets to them next. Whether young children also take into account such potential intervening events when they reason about the future is one of the specific questions that my first set of studies will address. In a second set of studies I will examine whether the cognitive mechanisms involved in mentally projecting the self into the future differ from those involved in mentally projecting another person's future. This issue is theoretically important since, by its very nature, episodic future thinking is defined as the pre-experiencing of one's own future. As such, we would expect differences in the way that people - including young children - make such projections for self and other. The final goal of this research program is to examine whether children's performance on the various tasks of episodic future thinking that will be used in this proposal is related to other higher-order cognitive processes, including theory of mind (or "mental state reasoning") and executive function (a set of cognitive abilities that allow individuals to solve problems or accomplish goals) that also develop between ages 3 and 5. The research I propose will shed light on the factors that influence the accuracy of children's future thinking, and will thus serve to inform parents and caregivers about contexts in which children may have particular difficulty reasoning about the future. It will also help to refine theories about the defining features of episodic future thinking and will have practical relevance for optimizing future thinking across the lifespan and mitigating the tendency for people to engage in behaviour with negative future consequences (e.g., failing to save for retirement).