Cyber-Physical Approaches for Attack Detection and Mitigation in Secondary Control Systems of Microgrids

微电网二次控制系统中攻击检测和缓解的网络物理方法

• 批准号: RGPIN-2019-06312
• 负责人: Liu, Shichao
• 金额: $ 2.04万
• 依托单位: Carleton University
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2022-01-01 至 2023-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=752591
• 关键词: Cyber; Physical; Approaches; Attack; Detection

To facilitate the rapidly increasing penetration of renewable-based distributed generations in power distribution systems, microgrids which can operate independently or in conjunction with their main distribution grids have been implemented. A microgrid has a hierarchical control structure including primary control, secondary control and tertiary control. For the seamless re-connection and disconnection of a microgrid to the main grid, voltage and frequency deviations have to be removed by secondary control which can be designed in either centralized or distributed structure. Both the centralized and distributed secondary control in microgrids involve the exchange of measurements and control signals among controllers through open networks. While supporting the data transmission in microgrids, these open networks also expose microgrids' secondary control systems to cyber attacks. The consequences of malicious attacks on power systems could result in large-scale blackouts and seriously affect human beings and the environment. To secure control systems of smart grids from cyber attacks, technical challenges on developing defense-in-depth security approaches for smart grids are still wide open, such as a deep understanding the interaction of cyber-system events and power system dynamics, new intrusion detection mechanisms and advanced mitigation approaches. The proposed research is to develop new cyber-physical solutions to these cyber security challenges in microgrid secondary control systems. The cyber-physical solutions will leverage a deep understanding of the intertwining relationship of cyber-system actions and physical-system dynamics in microgrids. The proposed cyber-physical approaches for attack detection and mitigation will help to improve the resiliency of electrical power systems (specifically microgirds) to cyber attacks and thus ensure their safe operation. This research could also bring benefits to the cyber security industry of smart grids in Canada by commercializing the proposed attack detection and mitigation algorithms as innovative intrusion detection and mitigation systems. Highly qualified engineers and researchers with multidisciplinary knowledge including control engineering, information technology and power systems will be trained for building stronger smart grids for Canada throughout this program.

为了促进基于可再生能源的分布式发电在配电系统中的迅速普及，已经实施了可以独立运行或与主配电网一起运行的微电网。微电网具有一次控制、二次控制和三次控制的分级控制结构。为了实现微电网与主电网的无缝重联和断开，必须通过二次控制消除电压和频率偏差，二次控制可以设计为集中式或分布式结构。微电网中的集中式和分布式二次控制都涉及控制器之间通过开放网络交换测量和控制信号。这些开放的网络在支持微电网数据传输的同时，也使微电网的二次控制系统面临网络攻击。对电力系统的恶意攻击的后果可能导致大规模停电，并严重影响人类和环境。为了保护智能电网的控制系统免受网络攻击，开发智能电网深度防御安全方法的技术挑战仍然悬而未决，例如深入了解网络系统事件与电力系统动态的相互作用，新的入侵检测机制和先进的缓解方法。拟开展的研究旨在开发新的网络物理解决方案，以应对微电网二次控制系统中的这些网络安全挑战。网络-物理解决方案将利用对微电网中网络-系统行动和物理-系统动力学之间相互交织的关系的深刻理解。拟议的检测和缓解攻击的网络物理方法将有助于提高电力系统(特别是微电网)对网络攻击的复原力，从而确保其安全运行。这项研究还可以将拟议的攻击检测和缓解算法作为创新的入侵检测和缓解系统进行商业化，从而为加拿大的智能电网网络安全行业带来好处。拥有控制工程、信息技术和电力系统等多学科知识的高素质工程师和研究人员将接受培训，以便在整个计划期间为加拿大建造更强大的智能电网。