PPP项目中的政府保证设计研究

为了解决PPP项目实践中对政府保证认识模糊、盲目承诺的突出问题，本课题拟揭示各类政府保证对社会资本激励作用的差异，并研究政府保证的Pareto最优设计。（1）识别并对比各类政府保证的应用范围、适用条件、可能导致的风险等特征，研究政府保证之间的层次关系；（2）基于激励与保健二元视角，构建政府保证、政府履约意愿、社会资本努力水平与项目绩效关系的研究模型，设计测量量表并检验路径关系；（3）针对单一政府保证和多种政府保证组合两种情况，以社会资本努力水平和社会资本的期望收益大于保留效用作为约束条件，以项目收益最大化和社会福利最大化为目标设计政府保证的双目标规划模型，求得Pareto最优解；（4）通过对典型PPP项目案例的研究，比较政府保证的应用差异并提出实务操作建议。.本课题是对PPP项目契约和激励理论的深化和完善，研究成果可以为公平、科学设计PPP项目契约中的政府保证条款提供依据。

This research intends to explain the differences in incentive effects on the private sector of various government guarantees and carry out the study on the configuration of government guarantees based on Pareto optimality to solve the pressing issues of indistinct recognition and blind commitment of government guarantees for the application of PPP projects. (1) Identify and analyze the features of various government guarantees, which include application range, conditions and possible risks, and construct the hierarchical relations of government guarantees. (2) Construct a relationship model of government guarantees, government’s performance willingness, the private sector’s effect level and project performance based on dualism of hygiene-motivational factors, develop the scale and test the path relationship of different variables. (3) Focus on single government guarantee and government guarantee portfolios respectively, propose a bi-objective programming model of government guarantee configuration that maximizes project revenue and social welfare with the constrains of the private sector’s effort level, expected revenue surpassing reservation utility, and finally obtain Pareto optimal solutions. (4) Analyze the differences of government guarantees and provide practical suggestions through case studies of typical PPP projects..This research is to deepen and improve the contract and incentive theories of PPP projects. The findings can provide references for a fair and scientific design of government guarantee clauses of PPP agreement.