公益型积极股东能否发挥治理作用？——基于中证投服“持股行权”的理论与实证研究

In February 2016, the China Securities Investor Services Center (ISC) launched a “Shareholder Engagement Movement” program, in which the ISC holds 100 shares of stock of every listed firm in China and actively engages in corporate governance by challenging the management, participating in shareholder meetings and launching public campaigns. The Movement has caught widely attention from the market as well as the public. Shareholder activism plays a pivotal role in corporate governance in the Western capital market. While existing literature focuses on the economically motivated shareholder activism, this study aims to answer whether a non-profit active shareholder has a governance role in the public firms, based on China’s institutional background and this ISC’s innovative practice. First, the study builds a theoretical framework based on the theories of shareholder monitoring as public goods, private enforcement of security laws, and reputation mechanism. Second, the study tests the governance role of the Shareholder Engagement Movement by examining its consequences in terms of corporate governance and other aspects. Third, the study tests whether the Movement has a spillover or crowding-out effect on the participation of corporate governance of other shareholders. Finally, the study examines the interaction between the private enforcement and the public enforcement in the form of security market regulation. Our analysis of this innovative practice of shareholder activism in China contributes to the shareholder activism as well as the investor protection literature, and could be instructive in enhancing China’s investor protection system.

2016年2月，中证中小投资者服务中心推出了持股行权试点，在持有全体上市公司1手股票的基础上，通过问询、参会、公开呼吁等形式积极行使股东权利，引起了市场与舆论的关注。积极股东是资本市场的重要治理力量，现有文献聚焦于基于经济动机的股东积极主义，本课题基于中国的特殊制度背景与持股行权的创新实践，探讨非营利动机的股东积极主义所发挥的治理作用。首先，基于股东监督的公共品视角、非公共执法、声誉机制等角度构建持股行权的理论分析框架。其次，从公司治理等多角度检验持股行权对上市公司发挥的监督治理作用；第三，分析持股行权对外部投资者参与公司治理的外溢效应或挤出效应；最后，探讨公益型积极股东的非公共执法与监管当局的公共执法之间潜在的替代或协同效应。本课题针对股东积极主义在中国创新实践的研究有助于深化股东积极主义与投资者保护领域相关理论，亦对我国进一步完善投资者保护体系、创新投资者保护手段具有实践指导意义。

2016年2月，中证中小投资者服务中心推出了持股行权试点，在持有全体上市公司1手股票的基础上，通过问询、参会、公开呼吁等形式积极行使股东权利，引起了市场与舆论的关注。积极股东是资本市场的重要治理力量，相较于现有文献聚焦于基于经济动机的股东积极主义，本项目创新地基于中国的特殊制度背景与持股行权的创新实践，探讨非营利动机的股东积极主义所发挥的治理作用。本项目研究发现，投服中心的持股行权事件与上市公司的信息披露质量和长期绩效显著正相关，支持了持股行权存在治理效应的假说。此外，本项目还研究了其他市场主体参与公司治理的经济后果。研究发现，中小股东积极在投资者交流平台上与管理层针对特定话题（现金股利）的互动，显著地影响了上市公司的相关决策（现金股利水平），进而丰富了本项目的研究结果。研究显示，作为公益型积极股东的投服中心，的确能发挥治理效应。本项目针对股东积极主义在中国创新实践的研究有助于深化股东积极主义与投资者保护领域相关理论，亦对我国进一步完善投资者保护体系、创新投资者保护手段具有实践指导意义。

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