碳交易是应对气候变化和推进低碳发展的一种重要市场机制，而排放权初始分配则是碳交易市场有效运行的基础。在常用排放权分配方法下，参与企业的非理性行为（如配额惜售、非理性履约等）往往会造成碳市场效率损失。本项目聚焦碳排放权分配机制，借助理论建模、行为实验和统计分析等多种方法工具，探究免费分配是否引起禀赋效应，识别拍卖过程赢家诅咒行为，剖析非理性竞价机理；比较不同分配方法下企业履约水平，揭示非理性履约行为机理；设计规避禀赋效应、实现价格发现、引导理性履约的碳排放权分配方法，提高碳排放权分配方法有效性和可靠性。以期完善碳排放权分配的理论体系，为我国碳交易市场的有效运行提供方法支撑和决策借鉴。

Emissions trading system is an important market instrument for controlling carbon emissions in response to global climate change and promoting low-carbon development. Carbon emission permit allocation plays an important role in emissions trading system. Under popular emission permit allocation rules, firm’s irrational behaviors, including irrational trading and incompliance, result in efficiency loss of ETS. This project aims to conduct in-depth research on carbon emission permit allocation mechanism considering firm irrational behaviors. First, we try to explore the endowment effect caused by free allocation of emission permits, recognize the winner curse in the auction process of emission permit and analyze the drivers for the higher bids. Second, we intend to compare firm’s compliance rate under different allocation rules and reveal the mechanism of firm’s incompliance. Third, we plan to design a better emission permit allocation rule to avoid endowment effect, help price discovery and ensure rational compliance. It is expected that this project could contribute to proposing a more efficient and reliable emission permit allocation rule. We believe that this research could offer scientific support for a well-functioning carbon market.