经济学者从理论上分析了承诺在金融契约中的经济价值，特别是在信息不对称的情况下，承诺有助于提高资源的配置效率。近年来，财务与会计领域开始关注业绩补偿承诺在上市公司并购重组中的作用，但对并购业绩补偿承诺的影响因素及其经济后果缺乏深入探讨。本课题以2008年证监会发布《上市公司重大资产重组管理办法》为切入点，从上市公司并购重组公告中的业绩补偿承诺协议入手，基于不完全契约理论和信息不对称理论，从收购方特征、并购特征和金融中介三个角度分析业绩补偿承诺及其契约条款的影响因素，追踪业绩补偿承诺对商誉减值及其经济后果的影响。本课题的研究在理论上拓展了不完全契约理论的应用领域及并购业绩补偿承诺的研究视角，完善了并购业绩补偿承诺经济后果的相关研究；实践上为上市公司优化业绩补偿承诺协议、为投资者理性看待业绩补偿承诺和商誉减值，以及为监管部门完善业绩补偿承诺和防控商誉减值风险提供理论支持和经验证据。

Economic scholars have theoretically analysed the value of covenant in business contracts, this can improve the efficiency of resource allocation especially under information asymmetry. Recently, finance and accounting studies are more concerned about the role of performance commitment covenant in M&A, in that respect is less emphasis on the determinants and economic consequences. This project examines the effects of performance compensation covenant based on the implementation of <Administrative Measures for the Material Asset Reorganizations of Listed Companies> issued by the CSRC in 2008, using incomplete contracts and information asymmetry theory to analysis the determinants of performance compensation covenant, examining goodwill impairment and economic consequences of performance compensation covenant. In this project, we expand the application of incomplete contract theory and the research perspective of M&A performance compensation covenant, also improve the economic consequences of M&A performance compensation covenant. Moreover, we present some empirical evidence for listed companies to optimize the performance of the commitment compensation covenant, investors can.therefore rationally look at the economic value of performance compensation covenant and goodwill impairment in M&A as well as for regulatory authorities improve related policies on performance compensation covenant.