加快港口业价格形成机制的市场化进程是关系到我国由“港口大国”迈进“港口强国”的核心课题，但在放松港口业价格管制过程中，作为危害最严重的限制竞争行为，合谋定价极大影响了港口资源配置效益和效率。本研究依据港口代际演进理论和新产业组织理论，在现代竞争理论、演化博弈理论和规制合谋防范理论基础上，采用探索性因子分析和结构方程模型等方法，以我国港口行业89家主要集装箱码头企业和17家港口上市公司为样本，首次对港口业价格管制政策演化路径与合谋定价风险问题进行深入研究，对于进一步阐明港口业放松价格管制的政策演化机理、揭示放松管制下港口价格市场动态博弈演化稳定策略形成及临界条件、改进港口企业合谋定价风险防范方法、深化对港口价格形成机制市场化改革问题的研究深度，具有积极的学术意义。同时，对于我国制定港口价格监管办法和健全监督检查机制、优化港口资源配置以实现持续健康发展等管理实际问题的解决也具有重要的推动作用。

The market-oriented acceleration of port price formation mechanism is the core issue related to the implementation of the strategy of "port power" in China. As the most serious restriction on competition, price collusion seriously affects the effectiveness and efficiency of port resource allocation in the process of port price deregulation. According to port generational evolution theory and new industrial organization theory, on the basis of modern competition, evolutionary game and collusion regulation, using exploratory factor analysis and structural equation modeling methods of 89 major port container terminals and 17 listed port companies in China's port industry, in-depth study on the evolution path and collusion risk prevention under port industry price regulation policy, to further clarify policy evolution mechanism of port industry price deregulation, revealing the evolutionary stable strategy of dynamic price game in port market, improving port collusion pricing risk prevention methods, deepening the market reform research of port price formation mechanism, which has a positive academic significance. At the same time, it also plays an important role in solving the port practical problems, such as the establishment of port price regulatory order, supervision and inspection mechanism, the optimization of port resource allocation, the development of sustainable and healthy China's port industry.