政府采购，作为我国政府重要的一项宏观调控工具，关乎着国民经济发展与社会福利。政府采购主要通过竞争性招标完成。本课题研究政府采购的最优机制，并着重分析两个重要问题。模块一研究在给定信息下的满足非歧视性条款的最优中标规则设计。现有文献通常假设招标者可以利用价格歧视来达到利益最大化。然而我国《招标投标法》同时要求利益最大化和公平原则（如保护本土企业兼顾公平对待外国企业）。该模块将构建一套全新方法来解决这一对看似冲突的原则。模块二研究在给定中标规则下的联合竞标中最优信息披露的设计。现实招标的每个竞标者通常都是一个团队。而现有文献的结果建立在竞标者都是个体的假设上。该模块将构建一套全新理论来研究信息披露在团队竞争投标中的作用，从而刻画最优信息披露规则。本课题对最优机制设计的文献在有非歧视性的约束和有信息披露的条件下的刻画将有理论上的贡献和突破。本课题对现实中的政府采购也会有重要的政策指导和现实意义。

Government Procurement is an increasingly important economic regulation tool, and it directly affects national economic development and social welfare. Government procurement is typically achieved through competitive bidding, and research on this issue can have significant policy implications in reality. In this project we will study optimal procurement design for competitive bidding, focusing on two important issues. Part one investigates optimal allocation rules under a given information structure. Most existing work on competitive bidding allows for price discrimination. In fact, revenue maximization is typically achieved through price discrimination. However, the Regulation on Public Bidding requires both “revenue optimality” and “fairness among bidders.” For example, our government has to protect domestic firms while at the same time treat foreign firms equally. In this part, we will develop a new theoretical framework to resolve this pair of conflicting principles. Part two analyzes optimal information disclosure policies in team bidding (or joint bidding) problems. Existing studies on information disclosure policies typically focus on scenarios with individual bidders. However, in reality, it is teams rather than individual bidders that compete against each other. And existing research results on bidding with individual bidders do not apply to bidding with team bidders. We intend to construct a new and useful theoretical model to study and characterize optimal information disclosure policies in competitive bidding problems with team bidders.