资本结构创新模式下销售合作社的农户激励机制设计

农户生产与投资激励问题既是制约农业销售合作社（简称合作社）生产、加工、销售纵向一体化发展的瓶颈、也是合作社资本结构创新亟待解决的关键问题。本项目以中国农业合作经济改革为背景，以合作社资本结构创新需求为导向，综合博弈理论、投资行为理论以及金融理论，针对三种创新型合作社：“比例投资型”合作社、“成员投资型”合作社和“股份投资者型”合作社，建立合作社与农户之间的金融契约模型。旨在揭示不同资本结构创新形式下合作社市场策略、金融策略以及农户激励策略之间的相互影响机制；明晰合作社资本结构创新的作用效果；提出规范合作社资本结构、保障农户权益的控制方法。该研究将原有仅考虑农户生产行为的激励模型扩展到同时考虑农户生产行为和投资行为的激励模型，更有利于分析影响合作社经济服务转型的行为因素。研究成果不仅丰富我国合作社管理理论研究，同时为我国发展现代化农业、推进合作社一体化经济具有重要的现实意义。

Investment constraints are often the “Achilles’ heels” of agricultural marketing cooperatives (co-ops), especially within an increasingly vertical-integrated food supply chain. Recently, many co-ops are using capital structure innovations to acquire risk capital, under which one critical challenge is how to motivate farmers in both production and capital investment. Current theoretical models; however, fail to consider farmers’ incentives in investment, and hence inefficient to solve the problems faced by Chinese co-ops. Therefore, by adopting incentive theory, portfolio theory, and financial theory, we specifically consider three new types of co-ops, including proportion investment co-ops, member-investor co-ops and share-investors co-ops. We aim to answer three questions: how farmers’ incentives interact with a co-op’s market strategies and financial strategies; what is the role of capital structure innovations on the co-op’s performance; and how to guarantee the benefits of farmers and their ownership rights under the capital structure innovations. We extend the incentive mechanism for production to a comprehensive incentive mechanism for both production and investment. This study will provide a quantitative analysis of a co-op’s financial and operational strategies; as such, it contributes to theoretical studies on Chinese co-ops.