佣金代理情况下零售商基于信任的订货决策和风险控制研究

在佣金代理情况下代理商占据市场核心地位，并且有增加推荐订货量的动机，从而最大化其期望收益。而零售商在实践中不同程度地依赖代理商的推荐订货量和自己的预估来分析市场需求状况并做出订货决策。本研究将代理商推荐订货量给零售商参考的行为称为“信任行为”，零售商对代理商推荐订货量的依赖程度定义为“信任”，研究佣金代理情况下的零售商基于信任的信息传递机制、不同场景下的订货决策和风险控制问题。本项目首先研究零售商信任形成的原理，建立信任评价机制，构建信任更新模型。然后，在此基础上，研究当多代理商分别采取联盟和竞争两种不同的信息分享方式时，零售商的信任值变化情况，以及零售商的优化订货量策略。最后，研究零售商通过价格补偿、保险押金等风险控制手段减少因交易期末代理商投机行为带来的信任风险，以及过度信任导致的订货风险。因此，本项目在完善供应链信任研究方面具有重要的研究价值和实践指导意义。

Under the circumstances of the commission-agency, the agent is probable to increase the order so as to optimize the expected revenue. However, the retailer relies more or less on the agent and their predictions on the market demand to decide their ordering strategy. Trust in this research refers to the degree where the retailer relies on and analyzes the retailer’s information transmission mechanism on the basis of trust, ordering strategy under different situations as well as problems related to the risk control under the circumstances of the commission agent. To begin with, we shall study on the principle of the formation of the retailer’s trust, establish the evaluation mechanism of trust and a more appropriate self-adaptive update model of trust value. And then, we shall study the situation when multiple agents adopt different information-sharing methods: alliance and competition, how the trust value changes and what optimal ordering strategy do the retailor take. At the end, we will research how the retailer reduces the trust value by the agent’s speculation and order risk by excessive trust by means of price compensation, insurance and so on, and how the synergy of the upstream and downstream companies of the supply chain is achieved. Therefore, the study will be of great research value and practical significance.