本研究项目以中国资本市场环境为背景，主要通过实验研究方法探索并验证投资者对公司披露信息的反应机制以及市场环境条件对投资者判断决策过程的影响，从而解释有别于西方文献结论的中国投资者反应行为。本研究项目以心理学基础理论为依托，从降低信息不对称和缓解委托代理问题两个角度出发，分别以盈利预测相关信息和管理层薪酬信息为切入点，探析信息属性市场反应差异的形成原因，环境因素如何影响投资者对信息可信度的关注，以及薪酬意见投票权对投资者相关决策判断的影响。本研究项目的开展将补充并完善有关信息披露经济后果的研究，强化对信息可信度影响的认识，探索薪酬意见投票可能对公司治理和投资者决策带来的影响，同时拓展了心理学理论在会计研究问题中的应用，从而帮助我们更好地理解中国资本市场中的投资者行为模式,也为信息披露制度的建设提供了前瞻性的政策指引。

This project investigates how investors react to corporate disclosure and how the market environment affects investors judgments and decision making process, to provide explanation for "abnormal" market reaction in Chinese capital market. We examine the underlying mechanisms of investors' reaction by conducting laboratory experiments. We compare investors' reactions to earnings- and compensation-related information under different environmental conditions respectively. The results help explain the economic consequences of a corporate disclosure in Chinese market from the perspectives of both information asymmetry and agency problem. Specifically, we investigate why bad news has a smaller market reaction than expected, how environmental conditions affect the role of information credibility, and how say-on-pay votes affect investors' judgments and decisions. This project contributes to several research areas including economic consequence of corporate disclosure, information credibility, say-on-pay votes and corporate governance. It also extends psychology research by applying psychological theories to accounting problems. This project extends our understanding of how investors behave in Chinese market. It provides practical implications for managers who disclose information, as well as investors and policy makers who use corporate disclosure to make decisions.