为了满足功能性和社会需求，消费者们越来越青睐于购买高端时装。然而消费者间的相互影响，使得他们有着不同的保留价格（如时尚领袖和时尚追随者），这就是所谓的炫耀性消费行为。对于时装供应链，如何在炫耀性消费行为的影响下选择供应合同、定价、产品采购和库存规划等方面的最佳策略与普通的供应链管理是截然不同的。在本项目中，我们主要研究在炫耀性消费行为影响下的时装供应链管理问题。通过运用经济学中经典的理性预期框架，我们建立拥有制造商（例如品牌所有者）和零售商（例如百货公司）的时装供应链模型。通过考虑同质和异质市场，研究在不同市场环境下零售商的均衡价格和库存量，我们将揭示在炫耀性消费行为影响下的时装供应链运营均衡决策的关键因素。除此之外，我们还将研究当时尚模仿者出现时对时装供应链的均衡决策的影响。本项目的研究成果将更好的了解时装市场，并极大的提高时装供应链的管理质量和经济效率，为时装业的发展提出理论基础及其参

It is well-observed that consumers who purchase high-end fashion products aim at satisfying both their functional needs and social needs. The consumer’s reservation price for the high-end product in each market segment (e.g., fashion leaders (i.e. snobs), and fashion followers) is different and mutually influenced, which is so-call conspicuous consumption. As such, the optimal strategies for managing the fashion supply chains, in terms of decisions such as choice of supply contracts, pricing, product sourcing and inventory planning, are intuitively different from the supply chains where conspicuous consumption is absent. In light of this, we propose to study the fashion supply chain management problems with conspicuous consumers. Under the classical rational expectations framework in economics, we will first construct analytical models for a single manufacturer (e.g., the brand owner) a single-retailer (e.g., the department store) supply chain selling a high-end fashion product. We will consider two market settings, namely the homogeneous and heterogeneous market. For each market setting, we will examine the retailer’s equilibrium pricing, and quantity decisions. The impacts brought by various important factors on the equilibrium decisions will be examined. In addition, we will examine the impact of the presence of fashion imitator on the equilibrium decisions. This study will contribute significantly to the emerging literature in supply chain management which considers different kinds of consumer behaviors, and generate many useful academic and managerial insights.