08年金融危机后，我国信贷资源配置效率显著下降，系统性金融风险显著上升，国企改革是推进金融体系支持实体经济发展的题中应有之义。本项目前期研究发现，08年后以大型、国有、上市公司为主的几千家企业在迅速积累大量债务，同时几十万家中小、私营企业融资愈加困难。基于此，本项目拟进一步探究08年后金融效率下降的原因，揭示国企改革与金融效率之间的深层次关联。首先，考察金融资源的配置，更深入分析08年后不断加杠杆的企业及其获得债权类融资的途径，关注僵尸企业和受“四万亿刺激经济计划”等重要产业政策支持的企业；其次，考察金融资源的使用效率，测度上述企业在产能过剩背景下的投资、在非主营业务上的投资及海外并购类投资的效率；最后，考虑到大量金融资源配置到国企且其各类投资效率较低，检验国企改革是否有助于抑制低效企业的过度融资并提升资金使用的效率。本项目研究有助于明晰我国系统性金融风险的成因，理解我国产业政策的作用机制

After the break of the 2008 financial crisis, the efficiency of credit allocation in China's financial system has dropped significantly. It is reflected by the decreasing role of finance in supporting China’s real economic growth, also results in rising systematic financial risks. Advancing state-owned enterprise reforms is the key to strengthening the role of China’s financial system and to improving financial efficiency. Our previous studies find that, after 2008, only several thousands of companies have significantly leveraged, mostly large-scale, state-owned, listed firms; contrarily, most Chinese small- and medium-sized firms, as well as private firms, have found it increasingly difficult to obtain finance. Following previous studies, this project aims to deeply understand the reasons for the decreasing financial efficiency after the crisis, and to reveal the deep-level relationship between state-owned enterprise reforms and financial efficiency. First, this project examines the allocation of financial resources, aiming to identify the part of firms that keep increasing their leverage after 2008, and the major sources of their debt finance as well. Special attentions will be paid on zombie firms and firms that are supported by major industrial policies, which include the four trillion stimulus plan. Second, this project examines the utilization efficiency of financial resources, including measuring the investment efficiency of these firms in the context of overcapacity, efficiency of their investment in non-core businesses and efficiency of overseas M&A investment. As a huge amount of financial resources are allocated to state-owned enterprises, but the efficiency of various types of investment made by state-owned enterprises is relatively low, the third part of this project tests whether state-owned enterprise reforms can help restrain the over-financing of inefficient enterprises, and improve their efficiency in using financial resources. This project is helpful to understand the causes of China’s systemic financial risks and the micro-mechanisms of China’s industrial policy implementation.