捆绑信息传递：市场解读、公司策略和私人渠道竞争

捆绑信息（bundled information）是指与单一信息传递相对而言，多重信息同时公开传递的行为。 相对于西方文献，中国的捆绑信息研究尚未起步，但是有自己独特的优势：一方面中国上市公司的年报本身带有捆绑信息的特点——同时披露当年盈余与管理层预测；另一方面中国是一个关系型交易以及私人信息传递较为普遍的国家，深入研究私人信息传递对于（公开）捆绑信息的竞争影响，可能对西方的研究结果做出独特的贡献。.本课题在前人研究的基础上，着重在三个方面进行讨论：第一方面是市场（以及分析师）对中国上市公司捆绑信息的解读研究；第二方面是上市公司是否会有意识的构建捆绑信息组合策略；第三方面是讨论私人信息渠道竞争对于捆绑信息的影响。.本课题的研究对于资本市场中的信息传递理论、企业行为理论等具有重要的理论意义，为中国资本市场信息环境建设提供新的认知基础，并有助于监管部门进行更有针对性的上市公司信息传递监管。

Bundled information refers to the public transmission of the multiple information at the same time, relative to the single information transmission. China's bundled information research has not yet started, but China has its own unique advantages and characteristics. On the one hand, China's listed companies' periodic reports (especially the annual report) have the characteristics of bundled information, while the simultaneous disclosure of the current surplus and the next year forecast. On the other hand, the relationship-based transaction and the private information transmission are more common in China. To study the influence of the competition from private information transmission on the (public) bundled information, may make a unique contribution to the western research results..On the basis of predecessors' research, this paper focuses on three aspects. The first aspect is the market (and the analyst) reaction to the bundled information of the listed companies in China. The second aspect is whether the listed companies will consciously construct the bundles Information combination strategy. The third aspect is to discuss the impact of private information channel competition on the bundled information..The project has great theoretical significance to the theory of information transmission in the capital market and the theory of corporate behavior. The research provides a new cognitive basis for the construction of China's capital market environment and helps the securities regulatory authorities to carry out more targeted listing company information transfer supervision.