中国地方政府土地经营行为的动机和影响研究

我国的经济已由高速增长阶段转向高质量发展阶段。地方政府以土地谋发展的模式在经济高速增长阶段曾发挥过重要的积极作用。然而，这种模式的弊端日益凸显，制约着经济可持续和高质量发展。基于此，本项目首先建立一个包含晋升激励和财税激励的统一分析框架，讨论地方政府土地经营行为的动机，并通过经验证据进行验证；其次，构建宏观动态随机一般均衡理论模型，通过数值模拟的方法来分析地方政府经营土地的行为和影响，并明晰背后的作用机制；然后，从实证上考察地方政府土地经营行为对地区工业经济发展、城镇化建设、基础设施投资和地方政府债务的影响，并区分时间效应和地区差异；最后，系统地提出完善地方官员考核评价和激励体系、推进财税体制改革、优化土地资源配置效率以及防范地方政府隐性债务风险和金融风险的相关政策建议。

China’s economy has been transitioning from a phase of rapid growth to a stage of high-quality development. The development model led by local governments that land supports economic growth once played a crucial and positive role. However, the disadvantages of this model have become increasingly prevalent as time passes by and they will put back the sustainability and the quality of economic growth. This project firstly sets up an analytical framework which incorporates promotional incentives and fiscal incentives to study the motivations of local governments to conduct land management behaviors, and provides evidences to support this framework. Then, a DSGE model is built to study local governments’ behaviors. The influences and the mechanisms are carefully examined with numerical simulations. Thirdly, we empirically explore how land management behaviors of local governments contribute to industrial development, urbanization, infrastructure construction and government debt. Time effect and regional differences are specifically addressed. Finally, based on the above results, relevant policy suggestions are put forward, such as how to improve the evaluation criteria of local government officials, how to reform the fiscal system, how to optimize the efficiency of land allocation, and how to prevent hidden-debt risk and financial risk.