央地分权视角下环境规制竞争与企业迁移行为研究

批准号:
72004060
项目类别:
青年科学基金项目
资助金额:
24.0 万元
负责人:
易国栋
依托单位:
学科分类:
环境与生态管理
结题年份:
2023
批准年份:
2020
项目状态:
已结题
项目参与者:
易国栋
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中文摘要
中国式央地分权模式下政治晋升和经济增长双重激励刺激了地方政府环境规制竞争行为,并且由此导致了大量的企业迁移与污染转移现象。本项目从央地分权入手,系统地研究中央政府、地方政府与企业之间的互动机制。基于委托代理理论、古诺博弈模型、Stackelberg博弈模型和企业区位选择模型构建同时考虑中央政府、地方政府和企业的多主体多阶段博弈模型,分析各主体的互动均衡策略;运用两区制空间Durbin模型等空间计量方法分析我国地区环境规制空间关联特征以及环境规制竞争形态与演化趋势;基于conditional logit model建立环境规制及竞争对企业迁移和区位选择的实证分析框架,构建区域高污染行业企业迁移指数,实证检验地方环境规制与企业迁移的互动关系;围绕政府政绩考核、跨区域生态环保协同治理、企业环境约束与激励机制提出政策建议,为我国环境保护政策的制定以及相应管理体制的完善提供决策参考。
英文摘要
The dual incentives of political promotion and economic growth under the mode of centralized decentralization in China stimulate local governments to regulate competition in the environment, which leads to a large number of enterprises' migration and pollution transfer. This project intends to study the interaction mechanism between the central government, the local government and the enterprises from the perspective of the decentralization of the central government and the local government.Based on the principal-agent theory, Cournot game model, Stackelberg game model and enterprise location choice model, this project will build a multi-agent multi-stage game model considering the central government, local government and enterprises at the same time, and analyze the interactive equilibrium strategy of each subject. Using spatial econometric methods such as Durbin model to analyze the spatial correlation characteristics of regional environmental. regulation and the competitive form and evolution trend of environmental regulation in China. Based on the conditional logit model, this project will establish an empirical analysis framework of environmental regulation and competition on enterprise migration and location selection, build the enterprise migration index of regional high pollution industries, and empirically test the interaction between local environmental regulations and enterprise migration. Policy suggestions are being put forward around government performance assessment, cross-regional ecological and environmental co-governance, enterprise environmental restraint and incentive mechanism, so as to provide decision-making reference for the formulation of environmental protection policy and the improvement of corresponding management system in China.
期刊论文列表
专著列表
科研奖励列表
会议论文列表
专利列表
DOI:10.1016/j.ecolind.2022.108808
发表时间:2022-03-31
期刊:ECOLOGICAL INDICATORS
影响因子:6.9
作者:Chen, Xiaohong;Zhou, Fangyi;Cao, Wenzhi
通讯作者:Cao, Wenzhi
DOI:doi.org/10.1016/j.engappai.2023.106835
发表时间:2023
期刊:Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence
影响因子:--
作者:Yang Y.;Yang F.;Yi G.;Xia D.;Li J.
通讯作者:Li J.
DOI:10.1016/s1003-6326(22)66135-1
发表时间:2023-02
期刊:Transactions of Nonferrous Metals Society of China
影响因子:4.5
作者:Ting Xiong;J. Cui;Longbo Jiang;Han Wang;Yi-fu Li;Changming Su;Yan-rong Chen;Xumin Cao;Xing-zhong Yuan;Guo-dong Yi
通讯作者:Ting Xiong;J. Cui;Longbo Jiang;Han Wang;Yi-fu Li;Changming Su;Yan-rong Chen;Xumin Cao;Xing-zhong Yuan;Guo-dong Yi
DOI:DOI: 10.1142/S1363919623500287
发表时间:2023
期刊:International Journal of Innovation Management
影响因子:2.1
作者:Hu D.;Lin M.;Feng S.;Yi G.
通讯作者:Yi G.
国内基金
海外基金
