两阶段竞自持土地拍卖制度的理论模型、政策效果和优化路径研究

批准号:
72103009
项目类别:
青年科学基金项目
资助金额:
20.0 万元
负责人:
张帅
依托单位:
学科分类:
区域经济
结题年份:
2023
批准年份:
2021
项目状态:
已结题
项目参与者:
张帅
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中文摘要
土地直接关系民生。如何优化土地出让机制设计,实现稳地价、稳房价、稳预期成为学术界和政策界的重要课题。两阶段竞自持土地拍卖近年广泛应用于中国土地市场,但现有文献并未做详细研究。本课题结合国内市场情况,引入实物期权模型等理论,结合租售现金流差异和两阶段竞价过程,构造竞自持土地二阶段拍卖模型,求解竞自持土地的最优开发时机和土地内在价值,提炼两阶段竞自持机制优于传统的竞地价机制的理论根源,进行数值模拟,分析影响土地溢价和自持比例的影响因素,继而采用倾向得分法、广义倾向匹配法、断点回归法,评估政策效果,并将断点回归拓展到多处理变量、多拐点情境,从组合政策和因城施策的角度,为优化竞自持机制提供量化依据。本课题目的在于推动新出让方式下土地价格形成机制研究,通过机制设计、改善公开拍卖的诸多弊端,助力破解房价“坚硬泡沫”。
英文摘要
Land is directly related to people's livelihood. How to optimize the design of land leasing mechanism to achieve stable land price, stable house price and stable expectation has become an important concern in academic and policy fields. Two-stage self-holding land auctions has been widely used in China's land market in recent years, but the existing literature has not been studied in detail.In this study, we introduce the real option model and other theories, combine the differences in lease and sale cash flows and the two-stage bidding process, construct a two-stage auction model for self-owned land, solve the optimal development timing and intrinsic land value, extract the theoretical root of the two-stage self-holding mechanism over the traditional bidding mechanism, and conduct numerical simulations to analyze the influential factors affecting the land premium and the self-holding percent. Then, we adopt the propensity score method, generalized propensity matching method and breakpoint regression method to evaluate the policy effect, and extend the breakpoint regression to multi-treatment variables and multi-inflection point situations to provide a quantitative basis for optimizing the self-holding mechanism from the perspective of combined policies and city-specific policies. The purpose of this project is to promote the research of land price formation mechanism under the new auction method, and help crack the "hard bubble" of housing price through mechanism design and improvement of drawbacks of open auction.
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DOI:--
发表时间:2022
期刊:经济学(季刊)
影响因子:--
作者:张帅;侯鑫彧;巴曙松
通讯作者:巴曙松
DOI:--
发表时间:2023
期刊:当代财经
影响因子:--
作者:巴曙松;柴宏蕊;赵文耀;张帅
通讯作者:张帅
DOI:--
发表时间:2023
期刊:管理评论
影响因子:--
作者:侯鑫彧;李广众;张帅
通讯作者:张帅
国内基金
海外基金
