本课题分析官员交流对地方国企高管治理的影响及其经济后果。具体拟回答以下几个问题：官员交流如何增强地方国企高管的激励约束机制？这种效应在制度环境较差的地区、高管具有政治关联的企业、平行交流的情况下是否更强？官员交流对地方国企高管的激励约束机制是否可以缓解管理者代理问题？提高企业资源配置效率并最终改善企业绩效？本课题拟以政府之手理论、腐败理论和管理者代理理论为基础，结合我国转型经济条件下在任地方政府官员对当地地方国企高管的任免具有一定影响的制度背景，从理论和实证两方面分析官员交流引起的“地方国企高管与在任政府官员利益关系网络的弱化”对该高管治理的影响及其经济后果。本课题不仅有助于拓展政府之手理论和管理者代理理论，并对官员交流和企业政治关联的相关研究进行发展和创新，形成对国有企业高管治理水平低下的新解释；实践方面提出解决国有企业高管代理问题的治理思路，为提高国有企业效率和投资者保护提出相关建议。

This project examines the effect of governors’ rotation on the executive governance of local state-owned firms, and its economic outcomes. We attempt to answer the following questions: First, How does the governors’ rotation strengthen the incentive and restraint of executives of local state-owned firms? Does the effect becomes more pronounced in the provinces with weak institutions, in the firms with politically- connected executives, or under the condition of other provincial governors’ rotation? Does the governance of governors’ rotation alleviate the agency problem of the executives of local state-owned firms? Does the governance of governors’ rotation improve the capital allocation efficiency and the performance of local state-owned firms? Based on the government intervention theory, corruption theory, and the agency theory, this project, under the condition that incumbent local governors have significant impacts on the appointment of the executives of local state-owned firms, analyzes the effect of governors’ rotation on the governance of executives and its economic outcomes via weakening the interests between the executives and the governors. Our project contributes to the government intervention theory, the agency theory, and the researches on governors’ rotation and politically-connected executives. Furthermore, this project sheds new light on the low governance of executives in the state-owned firms. In practice, our project provides guide for the agency problems of state-owned firms, and suggestions for the efficiency and investor protection of state-owned firms.