重复博弈是研究合作等行为的重要工具。经典重复博弈的研究中，博弈阶段数通常是外生给定的。但是在许多现实场景中，局中人往往选择离开当前令自己不满意的对手，然后寻找新的博弈对手再进行重复博弈。这类博弈模型被称为可分离重复博弈。以往关于可分离重复博弈的研究大部分采取模拟计算方法，申请人和合作者将进一步拓展这方面的理论分析工作。本项目拟基于前期积累的研究技巧和方法，对有限阶段和无限阶段可分离重复博弈在不同均衡概念下解的存在性和性质进行分析；运用演化博弈论和算法博弈论的工具和技巧，我们还研究可分离重复囚徒困境博弈和可分离重复公共物品博弈的合作涌现和均衡效率；并对一些现实问题运用我们的理论进行建模分析和实证研究。我们希望通过本项目研究将可分离重复博弈研究推向一个新的高度。

Repeated games is an important tool in the study of cooperation. In classical repeated games research,the number of stages is usually assumed to be exogenous and fixed. However, in reality, people often leave away from their current unfriendly opponents and find new ones to play the repeated games. This kind of game is called separable repeated games. While most of the previous research on separable repeated games is based on simulation results, we intend to accelerate the theoretical research on this field. Based on a series of research technique and methods, for different equilibrium concepts, we analysis the existence and property of the solution; using tools of evolutionary game theory and algorithm game theory, we also discuss the emergence of cooperation and the equilibrium efficiency in separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma games and public goods game. Moreover, we will combine our model with empirical study to analyse some practical problems. We hope our work push forward the research on separable repeated games to a new level.