监管资本套利(RCA)是商业银行在不违背资本监管制度的前提下，利用制度的内在缺陷，通过某种金融设计，在不改变实际风险水平的情况下降低监管资本要求的行为。其是Basel协议自身缺陷所导致的两大问题之一，也是Basel委员会不断修正Basel协议的主要原因。在我国，随着资本监管约束的强化，目前也已经出现了大量监管资本套利行为。我们预计与西方国家相对放任的态度不同，我国政府将给予监管部门更大程度的自由裁量权，并对监管资本套利给予较为严厉的惩罚。其中一个关键的问题便在于对监管资本套利银行的识别。项目拟基于监管资本套利的引发因素、展现结果与外部评价3方面信息，构建具有及时识别功能的判别模型。重点解决：非规避样本的可靠性、外部评价指标的有效性、解释变量的内生性以及规避手段的动态性等问题。项目旨在服务于Basel III框架下监管部门对于监管资本套利银行的识别，为其提高资本监管制度的有效性提供依据。

Regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA) is that: in the premise of capital supervision, commercial banks use the internal defects of regulatory system to reduce the regulatory capital requirements without any changing of their actual risk, through some financial designs. In our country, along with the strength of regulatory capital constraints, there have been a large number of regulatory capital arbitrage behaviors. We expect that, different from the laissez-faire attitude of western countries, the Chinese government will give a greater degree of discretion to regulators, and give more severe punishment to regulatory capital arbitrage. One of the key problems lies in the detection of regulatory capital arbitrage banks. The project intends to construct a detection model using 3 kinds of information including cause, performance and assessment. Focus on: the reliability of non circumvention, the validity of external assessment index, the interpretation of endogenous variables and the dynamic of circumvention. The project aims to serve for the detection of regulatory capital arbitrage banks bank supervision departments on the Basel III framework. And provide basis for improving the effectiveness of capital supervision system.