关键设备维修服务性能合同设计与激励行为研究

关键设备高可靠性水平运行是运营商和服务供应商共同努力的结果，它是运营商获取生产收益的根本保障。通过对关键设备运营和维修服务典型企业调研，提炼出维修服务合同设计三类新问题：考虑设备分批服役导致的维修需要非稳态特征，研究面向非稳态维修需求的服务合同设计序贯博弈模型，探索不同类型合同和备件库存所有权对激励供应商投资各项服务能力的行为机制；考虑多部件之间的维修相关性特征，提出运营商与多个供应商之间的服务性能合同（PBC）协同设计竞合博弈模型，探讨运营商精准激励多个供应商协同投资部件可靠性的行为规律；考虑设备故障严重损失生产收益情景，研究业务中断保险与PBC合同集成设计博弈模型，探索业务中断保险与供应商服务能力投资之间互动行为规律。所提炼的研究问题具有创新性，研究方法具有科学性和可行性，研究成果具有较强的理论价值，最终形成维修服务合同设计新思想方法，为关键设备维修服务合同决策提供科学依据和指导。

Maintaining a high level of system availability is of the utmost important footstone for production profit to many firms operating mission-critical equipment, which is the common effort outcome by the firm and service suppliers. After representative cases of maintenance service involved firms and service supplier are investigated in practice, three new characteristics for maintenance service contract design problem are proposed. The first is a non-stationary repair demand due to the increment of the fleet. The service contract design problem with non-stationary demand is proposed using a sequential game formulation. It is answered how two type contracts and the ownership structure of spare parts inventory motivate the supplier to invest the service ability. Secondly,considering the pertinence of repair between multiple subsystems, performance-based contract (PBC) coordinated design problem between one firm and multiple subsystem suppliers is presented using the biform game formulation. The behavior is studied how the firm accurately incentivizes multiple suppliers to invest in reliability. Finally, considering the risk of production profit damaged severely by malfunction, the contract design problem integrated business interruption insurance (BI) and PBC contract is proposed using the traditional game formulation. The relationship between BI and supplier's service operational measures is to explore. Our proposed problems is innovative and the methodologies adopted in the proposal are feasible and scientifical . The expected results have strong theoretical values, which finally form new ideas for service contract design. Expected results will provide the tools and methodologies for maintenance service practices.