订单农业和农超对接是当前农产品供应链的两种重要运营模式。两者相同之处在于公司均直接从农户处采购农产品。两者相异之处在于订单农业中公司承诺的最低采购数量和保底价给农户的利润兜底、从而能激励农户的生产积极性，但农超对接中公司没有给农户承诺。由于公司对市场需求信息的掌握要优于农户，所以订单农业中公司做出的承诺时会间接的披露(或泄露)自己所掌握的信息。由于这种信息披露削弱了公司的信息优势，可能会降低公司的利润。 本项目基于承诺在激励农户生产和削弱公司信息优势方面的不同作用，研究了公司在订单农业和农超对接之间的最佳合约选择问题。同时，本项目研究政府提供的最低采购价格承诺如何影响公司的合约选择（如导致公司不愿意做出承诺），揭示政府承诺可能会降低农户利润。我们期望能得到农业供应链的合约选择影响公司利润、农户收入的创新性成果，探讨实现双赢的激励机制促进农业供应链的可持续性发展，给出有意义的管理建议。

Two ways of directly sourcing from the farmers are practiced: contract farming and direct farm. Their difference lies in that the former promises an ex-ante procurement price and quantity for the contracted farmers (which motivate these farmers' incentive of production), while there is no price and quantity commitment in the latter. Also, the firm has better demand information than the farmers, so the commitment in contract farming can signal the firm's private information, which can be against the interest of the firm. Our project investigates the firm's optimal choice between these two contract types in the presence of the pros and cons of commitment, namely the farmers' high production incentive and a disclosure of the firm's private information. Moreover, our project explores the role of the government's price commitment upon the firm's contract choice, and shows that this government commitment may backfire by inducing the firm not to make commitment by adopting the direct farm, and can reduce the farmers' profit. We expect to obtain innovative results on the effect of these contract types upon the profit of the firm and the farmers, as well as a win-win mechanism for the sustainable development, based on which we offer managerial insights.