本项目以三级供应链为对象，探索和构建不同运作情景下制造商的激励契约设计模型和方法体系，为提高企业竞争优势和增强供应链的整体绩效提供有益的指导。具体工作包括：(1)在制造商与供应商共享质量信息的前提下，考虑生产活动和销售决策的相互影响，研究制造商通过构建信号传递博弈模型来探讨如何提高零售商服务水平的激励契约设计问题；(2)在制造商与零售商共享需求信息的前提下，考虑供应商生产成本的不对称性，研究制造商通过构建信息甄别博弈模型来探讨如何促进供应商提高产品质量的激励契约设计问题；(3) 在质量和需求信息不对称的前提下, 系统地考虑原材料供应，产品生产和销售活动的交互影响，研究制造商通过构建博弈模型来探讨如何提升零售商服务水平和提高供应商产品质量的双目标激励契约设计问题。相关的研究成果将完善激励理论在委托代理，供应链契约和产品质量控制等交叉领域中的研究，并为企业管理者科学地制定激励契约提供理论借鉴。

This project mainly examines the problem that how the manufacturer designs the incentive contract under different operational scenarios in a three-level supply chain. One objective of this work is to offer some helpful suggestions on raising the firm’s competitive advantage as well as strengthening the efficiency of the whole supply chain. The topics in this project include: (1) with the consideration of the interface between manufacturing and retailing, when the manufacturer and the supplier share with the product quality information, we employ the signaling model to explore how the manufacturer designs the optimal incentive contract so as to motivate the retailer to enhance the service level; (2) when the manufacturer and the retailer share with the market demand information, we use the screening model to study how the manufacturer designs the optimal incentive contract under asymmetric production cost information so as to motivate the supplier to enhance the quality level; (3) with the consideration of the interface between supplying, manufacturing and retailing, we analyze how the manufacturer designs the optimal incentive contract under asymmetric information of both product quality and market demand so as to motivate the retailer to work hard and, at the same time, motivate the supplier to enhance the quality level. Some relevant results not only make a contribution to the study of incentive theory, supply chain contract, principal-agency theory and product quality control, but also provide some scientific and effective suggestions for the managers to design the optimal incentive contract.