担保信用融资下的供应链运营优化与博弈研究

随着全球经济增速放缓，不少企业遇到融资难问题，尤其是中小企业普遍存在资金短缺的问题。供应链金融是银行融资之外的重要融资手段，其中担保信用融资是一种全新的供应链金融实践，其理论研究尚未引起重视。本项目拟以资金受限供应链为研究对象，在担保信用融资模式下探讨企业运营优化与供应链博弈问题。主要研究四类问题：（1）分别考虑零售商资金受限与供应商资金受限情形，研究担保信用融资下供应链上的采购与定价决策、信用担保额度决策、银行的利率决策优化与博弈问题；（2）通过博弈均衡分析，比较担保信用融资与贸易信用融资和银行融资的异同，以及不同融资模式的风险分担机制；（3）考虑信息不对称，研究担保信用融资中供应链决策优化与博弈均衡；（4）分别考虑零售商需求竞争与供应商供应竞争情形，研究担保信用融资下的供应链运营优化与博弈问题。本项目的预期成果有助于丰富供应链管理的理论，为供应链金融实践提供指导，具有较高的现实意义。

SMEs often face insufficient working capital, and they receive limited support from the banking system. Insufficient working capital often constrains operational decisions. There are often two common ways to address such problems in practice: trade credit financing and asset-based lending. Guarantee credit is a new mixed financing method that is increasingly in practice. Guarantee credit refers to bank loans provided to one firm based on a guarantee provided by a focal company in the supply chain.Guarantee credit becomes very important in fast-growing emerging economies such as China, where small and fast-growing firms get limited support from banks. For example, China Minsheng Bank provides guarantee credit in cooperation with focal companies. Haier Group provides financial support for their dealers to sell Haier’s products through its financial holdings company. With guarantee credit, the capital constrained firm easily obtains bank loans to support its operations, and the focal company can increase its revenue, and the bank has less financial risk..This project will study operations optimization and game analysis of guarantee credit financing in supply chain. We will study four main problems..(1) We firstly consider a supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer, a capital constrained retailer, and a bank. The manufacturer is assumed to be capital abundant to cover its expenditures. We analyze how the retailer and manufacturer makes financial and operational decisions under guarantee credit financing? What is the retailer’s optimal decisions of ordering and capital requirement? What is the manufacturer’s optimal guarantee credit limit? How are these decisions affected by price, cost, and the retailer’s budget? And how does the retailer’s initial working capital affect the supply chain partners’ behavior and performance? Then, we consider a supply chain system consisting of a capital constrained manufacturer, a retailer, and a bank, and investigate the similar problems. .(2) We compare guarantee credit financing (GCF) with trade credit financing (TCF) and bank credit financing (BCF) in order to answering the problems: Is guarantee credit financing a substitutable or complementary choice? In what case, guarantee credit financing outperforms trade credit financing (TCF) and bank credit financing (BCF). What are the key parameters that will affect the equilibrium results? .(3) We extend the above study in supply chain with asymmetric information. We consider three kinds of asymmetric information: uncertain demand, product quality, and supply reliability, respectively. It is common that the downstream firm in the supply chain has more demand information, and the upstream firm has more information on product quality and supply reliability. In the three cases with asymmetric information, we study how the asymmetric information affect the retailer’s and supplier’s decisions? Does the information advantage always benefit one firm but harm another? .(4) We consider retailer competition and supplier competition with guarantee credit financing. To understand how retailer competition affects supply chain partners’ operational and financial decisions under guarantee credit financing, we examine a supply chain system composed of a capital-constrained retailer, a capital-abundant retailer and a manufacturer in the presence of substitutable product competition, and capital-constrained retailer get support from the supplier with guarantee credit financing. In the supplier competition case, we examine a supply chain system composed of a capital-constrained supplier, a capital-abundant supplier and a retailer in the presence of substitutable product competition, and a capital-constrained supplier get supports from the retailer. We will identify the strategic interaction between the retailers and the manufacturer in these two scenarios.