p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
复制标题
完美前视动力学下的 p 支配与均衡选择
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2955
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daisuke Oyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Daisuke Oyama
本文研究了基于一类完美预见动力学的均衡选择问题，并将其与p-显性的概念联系起来。理性参与者的连续体被重复且随机地匹配，以玩对称的n n博弈。存在摩擦：修改行动的机会遵循独立的泊松过程。动态具有驻留状态，每个驻留状态对应于静态博弈的纳什均衡。严格的纳什均衡在完美预见动态下是线性稳定的，如果与当前的动作分布无关，存在一致的信念，即任何玩家在每次修改机会都必须玩纳什均衡动作。证明了在具有小摩擦的完美预见动力学下，严格纳什均衡是线性稳定的当且仅当它是p<；1=2的p-占优均衡；还证明了，如果一个严格纳什均衡是p<；1=2的p-占优均衡，那么它对小摩擦唯一吸收(且全局可达)(反之亦然)。引入了集值稳定性概念，并证明了它们的存在性。《经济文献》分类编号：C72、C73。
This paper studies equilibrium selection based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics and relates it to the notion of p-dominance. A continuum of rational players are repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric n n game. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. The dynamics has stationary states, each of which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the static game. A strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics if, independently of the current action distribution, there exists a consistent belief that any player necessarily plays the Nash equilibrium action at every revision opportunity. It is shown that a strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics with a small degree of friction if and only if it is the p-dominant equilibrium with p < 1=2. It is also shown that if a strict Nash equilibrium is the p-dominant equilibrium with p < 1=2, then it is uniquely absorbing (and globally accessible) for a small friction (but not vice versa). Set-valued stability concepts are introduced and their existence is shown. Journal of Economic Literature Classication Numbers: C72, C73.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
KANDORI, M;MAILATH, GJ;ROB, R
通讯作者：
ROB, R