Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Increasing Marginal Costs
Endogenous Timing in Mixed Duopoly with Increasing Marginal Costs
复制标题
边际成本增加的混合双头垄断中的内生时机
DOI：
10.1628/093245610793524893
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
Kazuharu Kiyono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yoshihiro Tomaru;Kazuharu Kiyono
本文研究了在边际成本递增的条件下，混合双寡头垄断中公共企业和私人企业的理想角色。与使用恒定边际成本模型的Pal [1998]和Mat- sumura [2003 a]相反，我们表明每个公司都有可能更喜欢领导者或追随者的角色。此外，本文还利用汉密尔顿和斯卢茨基[1990]的可观测延迟博弈分析了这两类企业生产时间的内生性。我们发现，即使边际成本增加，我们可以得到的结果-这两种类型的斯塔克伯格的结果是在均衡。
This paper investigates the desirable roles of both public and private firms with increasing marginal costs in mixed duopoly. In contrast to Pal [1998] and Mat- sumura [2003a], who use the constant-marginal-cost model, we show that it is possible for each firm to prefer the role of either the leader or the follower. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the endogenization of the production timing of both types of firms by using the observable-delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky [1990]. We find that even with increasing marginal costs, we can obtain Pal's result - the two types of Stackelberg outcomes are in equilibrium.
影响因子：
1.7
作者：
D. Hirata;Toshihiro Matsumura
通讯作者：
D. Hirata;Toshihiro Matsumura