Labor Representation in Governance as an Insurance Mechanism
Labor Representation in Governance as an Insurance Mechanism
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治理中的劳工代表作为一种保险机制
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2399399
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Christoph Schneider
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. H. Kim;Ernst Maug;Christoph Schneider
我们调查了德国规定的监事会中劳工代表比例为 50% 的规定，在不利的行业冲击期间如何影响裁员和工资。我们假设平等共同决定有助于隐性合同的实施，以确保员工免受不利冲击。我们使用企业层面的面板数据来估计就业和工资的双重差异。结果显示，具有平等共同决策的公司的白领和熟练蓝领员工在冲击期间受到保护，免受裁员。但在董事会中缺乏真正代表权的非技术蓝领工人则不然。而且，白领和熟练蓝领工人以较低工资的形式缴纳3%左右的保险费。为这些员工提供保险的效果体现在更高的运营杠杆上：在冲击时期，平价共同决定的公司的盈利能力和估值会遭受更大的下降，股票贝塔值会大幅增加，并会进行更多的资产出售来为保险赔付提供资金。
We investigate how Germany’s mandated 50% labor representation on supervisory boards affects layoffs and wages during adverse industry shocks. We hypothesize that parity-codetermination helps the implementation of implicit contracts that insure employees against adverse shocks. We estimate difference-in-differences in employment and wages using panel data at the establishment level. The results show white-collar and skilled blue-collar employees of firms with parity-codetermination are protected against layoffs during shock periods. But unskilled blue-collar workers, who lack real representation on the board, are not. Moreover, white-collar and skilled blue-collar workers pay an insurance premium of about 3% in the form of lower wages. The effects of insuring these employees manifest in higher operating leverage: During shock periods, parity-codetermined firms suffer greater reduction in profitability and valuation, witness greater increase in stock beta, and engage in more asset sales to finance insurance payoffs.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
E. Perotti;Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
通讯作者：
E. Perotti;Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden