Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe
Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe
复制标题
否决者理论与西欧改革
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
D. Strobl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Mariyana Angelova;H. Bäck;W. Müller;D. Strobl
摘要否决者理论预测了政府政策改变的能力。由于很难确定改变政策现状所需的重要法律，关于政府改变政策能力的证据主要是为有限数量的改革和单一国家研究提供的。为了评估否决者理论在不同时间、政策领域和国家的政策制定中的预测能力，收集了一个数据集，其中包含了13个西欧国家从20世纪80年代中期到21世纪初在社会、劳动、经济和税收政策领域采取的约5，600项重要政府改革措施。否决者理论与其他来自政治经济学（危机驱动的政策变化）和党派理论（意识形态驱动的政策变化）的政策变化的核心理论预期一起应用于组合模型。研究发现，当经济状况不佳，政府的定位远离政策现状时，政府会推出更多的改革措施。没有经验支持的否决权球员理论的预测在其纯粹的形式，其中没有区分政府类型。然而，研究结果提供了支持否决权的球员理论在特殊情况下，最小的获胜内阁，所有政府政党的支持是足够的（与少数内阁相比）和必要的（与超大内阁相比）的政策变化。特别是，它被发现，在最低限度的获胜内阁的极端政府政党之间的意识形态距离显着降低了政府的能力，推出改革。这些发现提高了我们对议会民主制改革决策的理解，并突出了未来否决权参与者理论的应用和测试的重要问题和开放问题。
Abstract Veto player theory generates predictions about governments’ capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments’ ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single‐country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600 important government reform measures in the areas of social, labour, economic and taxation policy undertaken in 13 Western European countries from the mid‐1980s until the mid‐2000s. Veto player theory is applied in a combined model with other central theoretical expectations on policy change derived from political economy (crisis‐driven policy change) and partisan theory (ideology‐driven policy change). Robust support is found that governments introduce more reform measures when economic conditions are poor and when the government is positioned further away from the policy status quo. No empirical support is found for predictions of veto player theory in its pure form, where no differentiation between government types is made. However, the findings provide support for the veto player theory in the special case of minimal winning cabinets, where the support of all government parties is sufficient (in contrast to minority cabinets) and necessary (in contrast to oversized cabinets) for policy change. In particular, it is found that in minimal winning cabinets the ideological distance between the extreme government parties significantly decreases the government's ability to introduce reforms. These findings improve our understanding of reform making in parliamentary democracies and highlight important issues and open questions for future applications and tests of the veto player theory.
选举脆弱性如何影响养老金政治：介绍概念、测量和实证应用
影响因子：
5.3
作者：
Immergut;Abou-Chadi
通讯作者：
Abou-Chadi
影响因子：
2.7
作者：
Steffen Ganghof;Thomas Bräuninger
通讯作者：
Thomas Bräuninger