Hypothesis and Theory Article a Cognitive Account of Belief: a Tentative Road Map a Functional Perspective on Belief Characteristics and Dimensions of Belief
Hypothesis and Theory Article a Cognitive Account of Belief: a Tentative Road Map a Functional Perspective on Belief Characteristics and Dimensions of Belief
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假设和理论文章信仰的认知描述：暂定路线图信仰特征和信仰维度的功能视角
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通讯作者：
Halligan
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作者：
Michael H. Connors;P. Halligan;Dementia;Halligan
在过去的几十年里，妄想症已经成为临床和认知神经科学领域日益增长和富有成效的研究的主题。尽管如此，支撑错觉构建的信仰的本质几乎没有得到正式的调查。然而，如果没有对信念本身的认知水平分析，对错觉的描述是不完整的。这种忽视的一个原因是，假设信念不同于更成熟和更容易获得的模块化心理过程(例如，视觉、听力、人脸识别、语言处理和运动控制系统)，信念包括更分散的中央认知过程，因此更难获得。在本文中，我们提出了信念的一些定义特征和功能。从对错觉的认知解释出发，我们考虑了可能与正常信念形成有关的潜在候选认知过程。最后，我们提出了信念过程的多阶段描述，这可以为更全面的信念模型提供基础。被认为是错误信念的引导性妄想，已经成为包括精神病学、心理学和认知神经科学在内的多个科学和医学学科的研究对象。虽然这些方法中的每一种都提供了一个关于错觉的重要视角，但支撑这一结构的信仰的性质在很大程度上仍然没有具体说明。在试图解释错觉是如何形成的时候，理解信仰的本质具有特别重要的意义。在过去的40年里，已经提出了几种相互竞争的说法来解释妄想症，尽管这些说法强调了导致妄想症的可能损害--包括过度和缺陷--但他们的主要关注点一直是识别导致妄想症的特定神经心理异常，而没有明确地解决信仰的性质。因此，这些解释必然是不完整的，因为它们没有考虑非病理性信仰形成的基础和更广泛的影响。对妄想症的全面描述可能需要参考非病理性信念形成所涉及的过程，以充分描述病理的本质。认知神经精神病学(Halligan and David，2001)曾强调，需要一个概念框架来解释非病理信念，它将异常过程(精神病理学)的解释置于对正常心理学的现代理解中。正如马歇尔和哈利根(1996，p.9)所写的：“.正常的信息处理系统是任何心理功能障碍都必须被定义的领域。解释推理障碍的前提是…
Over the past decades, delusions have become the subject of growing and productive research spanning clinical and cognitive neurosciences. Despite this, the nature of belief, which underpins the construct of delusions, has received little formal investigation. No account of delusions, however, would be complete without a cognitive level analysis of belief per se. One reason for this neglect is the assumption that, unlike more established and accessible modular psychological process (e.g., vision, audition, face-recognition, language-processing, and motor-control systems), beliefs comprise more distributed and therefore less accessible central cognitive processes. In this paper, we suggest some defining characteristics and functions of beliefs. Working back from cognitive accounts of delusions, we consider potential candidate cognitive processes that may be involved in normal belief formation. Finally, we advance a multistage account of the belief process that could provide the basis for a more comprehensive model of belief. " Nothing appears more remote from the current frontiers of neuroscience than the circuits underlying the fixation and mutation of human beliefs " INTRODUCTION Delusions, considered as false beliefs, have been the subject of study from a wide range of scientific and medical disciplines, including psychiatry, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. While each of these approaches provides an important perspective on delusions, the nature of belief that underpins the construct remains largely unspecified. Understanding the nature of belief is of particular significance when trying to explain how delusions form. Over the past 40 years, several competing accounts have been proposed to explain delusions Although these highlight possible impairments – including both excesses and deficits – responsible for delusions, their primary focus has been to identify specific neuropsychological abnormalities responsible for delusions and do not explicitly address the nature of belief. As such, these accounts are necessarily incomplete as they do not consider the basis and broader influences of non-pathological belief formation. A comprehensive account of delusion will likely require reference to the processes involved in non-pathological belief formation to fully characterise the nature of the pathology. This need for a conceptual framework to explain non-pathological belief has been previously highlighted by cogni-tive neuropsychiatry (Halligan and David, 2001), which locates explanations of abnormal processes (psychopathology) within a modern understanding of normal psychology. As Marshall and Halligan (1996, p. 9) wrote: ". . .normal informational processing systems are the domain over which any disorder of psychological function must be defined. The elucidation of a disorder of reasoning presupposes an …
你不能不相信你读到的一切。
影响因子：
7.6
作者：
Gilbert,DT;Tafarodi,RW;Malone,PS
通讯作者：
Malone,PS