Economic Consequences of Nonexpected Utility Theory: A Game Theoretic Analysis

近年来，人们对决策模型的兴趣日益浓厚 在不确定的情况下，不假设独立公理， 冯·诺伊曼-摩根斯坦效用理论 对这些的兴趣 理论的动机是大量的实验证据 这表明决策者系统性地违反了 公理 非预期效用理论已经被证明能够 同时，他也是一个很有经验的人。 适当的假设，保留许多有用的经济 期望效用理论的含义 这一贡献 一个项目是确定这一理论的经济含义 与期望效用理论不同 该项目探索了两个主要领域， 不确定条件下的个人决策：拍卖理论与 讨价还价理论 在这两种情况下，项目都定义了均衡 并建立其存在的条件。 在制定和游戏的结果的差异 这是由于偏好在空间上的非线性造成的， 检查概率分布。 这一努力的一个副产品是 对广泛形式博弈的重新审视， 通过引入不可代表的偏好， 期望效用函数 这是在以下背景下完成的： 具体的游戏，但结果应该是相关的广泛的 游戏一般来说。

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in models of decision making under uncertainty that do not assume the independence axiom of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory. The interest in these theories is motivated by the large body of experimental evidence suggesting that decision makers systematically violate the independence axiom. Nonexpected utility theories have been shown to be capable of explicating this experimental evidence, and, at the same time, under appropriate assumptions, of preserving many of the useful economic implications of expected utility theory. The contribution of this project comes in identifying the economic implications of this theory that are different from expected utility theory. The project explores two main areas using the new theories of individual decision making under uncertainty: auction theory and bargaining theory. In both cases the project defines the equilibrium of the relevant game and establishes the conditions for its existence. The differences in the formulation and in the outcome of the games resulting from the nonlinearity of the preferences over the space of probability distributions is examined. A by product of this effort is the reexamination of the formulation of extensive form games made necessary by the introduction of preferences that are not representable by expected utility functionals. This is done in the context of specific games, but the results should be relevant to extensive form games in general.