Sellers and Heterogeneous Bidders at Auctions: Non Cooperative and Collusive Strategic Behavior

大多数关于拍卖的现有研究都是在一个 与同质风险中性投标人的非合作框架， 风险中性拍卖人可以宣布保留价。 的 该项目的贡献来自于工作在相对 不同投标人和投标人串通的未开发领域。 这 研究的动机是在拍卖中观察到的行为，如嵌套 买方环形结构、非包容性环形结构和提升衬里（幻影 拍卖人（Auctioners） 以前的工作解释了一代 通过练习英式拍卖和 投标人串通 需要进一步的研究来概括这些 结果更复杂和现实的环境，并研究其他 拍卖方面。 调查人员过去的高质量 研究表明他们有能力做这项工作。 该项目调查了异质投标人的行为， 拍卖师在第一价格，荷兰，和第二价格拍卖。 关于投标人的分布信息通常是未知的， 因此贝叶斯拍卖师对出价数据的处理 和随之而来的战略行为进行了探讨。 该项目解释说， 为什么只有所有包容性的投标人联盟是可行的，在第一个价格 和荷兰式拍卖，以及为什么各种规模的联盟被观察到， 英国拍卖 该项目调查，如果某些投标人类型 要么不受欢迎，要么不愿意加入一个联盟， 英国拍卖 最后，该项目解释了投标人联盟如何 尽量避免分享收益所造成的激励问题， 联盟的形成。 同时和顺序博弈模型 用于研究投标人联盟的嵌套和其他方式， 有效地分享收益。

Most of the existing research on auctions has been conducted within a non-cooperative framework with homogeneous risk neutral bidders where the risk neutral auctioneer can announce a reserve price. The contribution of this project comes from working in the relatively unexplored areas of heterogeneous bidders and bidder collusion. This research is motivated by observed behavior at auctions such as nested buyer ring formation, non-inclusive rings and lift-lining (phantom bidding) by auctioneers. The previous work explained the generation of phantom bids by practicing English auctions and the durability of bidder collusion. Further research is needed to generalize these results to more complex and realistic environments and to study other aspects of auctions. The high quality of the investigators' past research shows that they have the ability to do the work. The project investigates the behavior of heterogeneous bidders and the auctioneer at first price, Dutch, and second price auctions. Distributional information regarding bidders is usually unknown by the seller, so the processing of bid data by a Bayesian auctioneer and consequent strategic behavior are explored. The project explains why only all inclusive bidder coalitions are viable at first price and Dutch auctions and why coalitions of all sizes are observed at English auctions. The project investigates if certain bidder types are either undesirable to, or, unwilling to join a coalition in an English auction. Finally, the project explains how bidder coalitions try to avoid the incentive problems created by sharing the gains of coalition formation. Both simultaneous and sequential game models are used to study nesting of bidder coalitions and other ways of efficiently sharing the gains.