Models & Tests of Political Business Cycles

尽管有一些证据表明，两个党派周期（周期中， 政治现任者追求党派经济政策）， 选举周期（执政党操纵选举周期） 经济改善连任的前景），令人满意 与这一证据相一致的理论模型还没有被 开发 这个为期两年的项目开发和测试这样的模型， 致力于调和党派和选举模式 以及解决先前测试的不确定性。 更具体地说，该项目（1）开发和模拟了一个 一个简单的随机经济模型，在这个模型中， 理性，市场是有效的，但信息是不完整的， 如果一个现任政府有特定的偏好， 通货膨胀和失业可以产生随机业务 循环;（2）通过以下方式扩展该模型以解释党派循环： 引入第二政党、选举和异质选民; (3)测试党派模型对观察到的政策，中央 宏变量和微观层面的投票者行为;（4）扩展了 党派模式，包括一个前瞻性的现任党， 诱导选举周期，以表明其偏好， 增加连任的可能性;（5）探讨了选举的性质 党派均衡与选举周期;（6）测试 综合党派选举模型对数据的 美国（第二次世界大战前后）和其他 有固定任期的国家。

Despite some evidence of both partisan cycles (cycles in which political incumbents pursue partisan economic policies) and electoral cycles (in which incumbent parties manipulate the economy to improve the prospect of reelection), satisfactory theoretical models consistent with this evidence have not been developed. This two-year project develops and tests such models, concentrating on reconciling the partisan and electoral models and on resolving the inconclusiveness of previous tests. More specifically, the project (1) develops and simulates a simple stochastic model of an economy in which gents are rational, markets are efficient, but information is incomplete, where an incumbent government with given preferences over inflation and unemployment can generate stochastic business cycles; (2) extends this model to account for partisan cycles by introducing a second party, elections, and heterogeneous voters; (3) tests the partisan model against observed policies, central macrovariables, and micro-level voter behavior; (4) extends the partisan model to include a forward-looking incumbent party which induces electoral cycles to signal its preferences so as to increase the probability of reelection; (5) explores the natures of the partisan equilibrium with electoral cycles; and (6) tests the synthesized partisan electoral model against data for the United States (both pre and post-World War II) and for other countries with fixed electoral terms.