Interpretation of Probabilities in Physics

在经典物理学中，概率的作用主要是表达无知和观点。之所以需要概率，是因为物理学家根本没有足够的信息来做出绝对的确定。然而，原则上，就像帕斯卡的“超人”一样，如果科学家有足够的先验信息，他们就不需要概率。然而，20世纪的量子革命否认这一点肯定是可能的，即使对先前条件有无限的了解。爱因斯坦反对量子理论，因为它否认曾经实现确定性，即“上帝不会与宇宙掷骰子”。在这项研究项目中，范·弗拉森教授正在研究物理学中概率使用的两个不同方面，即由于事先信息不足而导致的“无知或意见”，以及由于诸如量子理论等否认确定性可能性的理论。第一个问题是一个普遍的问题：在接受一个(不可还原的)统计理论时，涉及到关于现实世界的什么信念？为了更准确地表述这一点，信念的概念被意见的概念取代，表示为个人概率。关于客观偶然性(物理概率)的观点如何限制对实际发生的事情的看法，有一个普遍接受的配方。第一个问题的任何解决方案都可能需要这个配方的正确性；还可能制定其他要求。第二个问题是当代物理学所特有的：我们如何解释它所呈现的概率及其特有的“概率干扰”和“个体同一性丧失”的特征？范弗拉森教授将特别参考量子理论的一种解释(模式解释的哥本哈根变体)和量子理论中的一个领域(相同粒子的统计行为)来研究这个问题。

In classical physics, the role of probability was primarily to express ignorance and opinion. Probability was needed because the physicist simply did not have enough information to make an absolute determination. In principle, however, as with Pascal's "superman," if scientists had sufficient prior information, they would not need probabilities. The quantum revolution of the 20th century, however, denied such certainly is ever possible, even with infinite knowledge of the prior conditions. Einstein objected to quantum theory, because of its denial of ever achieving certainty, that "God does not play dice with the Universe." In this research project, Professor Van Fraassen is examining these two differing aspects of the use of probabilities in physics i.e. that which is due to "ignorance or opinion" given insufficient prior information, and that due to theories like quantum theory which deny the possibility of certainty. The first problem is a general one: what belief is involved concerning the actual world, in the acceptance of a (n irreducibly) statistical theory? To formulate this more precisely, the concept of belief is replaced by that of opinion, represented as personal probability. There is a generally accepted recipe for how opinions about objective chance (physical probability) constrain opinions about what will actually happen. Any solution to the first problem may be required to entail the correctness of this recipe; other requirements may also be laid down. The second problem is specific to contemporary physics: what interpretation can we give to the probabilities it presents with their characteristic features of "probability interference" and "loss of individual identity"? Professor Van Fraassen will investigate this problem with special reference to one interpretation of quantum theory, (the Copenhagen variation of the modal interpretation), and one area in quantum theory (statistical behavior of identical particles).