Economic Models of Legal Complexity and Liability Rules

经济考虑塑造了诉讼的轮廓， 作为对疏忽行为的威慑，这反过来可能导致 诉讼 增益的幅度和概率的估计可以是 预计将塑造律师对给定复杂程度的偏好 法律的学说。 这种估计也通过负债来进行 规则，以影响激励，以采取措施，以避免事故。 具体来说，白色博士侧重于两个主题的领域，法律和 经济学交叉：1）模拟法律的复杂程度 二是重新审视美国的主要责任规则。S.律师， 事故法上的比较过失规则， 使用数据对过失规则适用的实证分析 加州的一系列车祸 的调查 法律的复杂性模型及其对律师行为的影响 和诉讼当事人和案件的结果包括考虑的 不同支付方式对律师和案件的影响 涉及税法，其中原告始终是国税局， 最大限度地提高未缴税款的双重目标 通过审计或诉讼，并尽量减少纳税人的激励， 首先是逃税。 此外，该研究还得出了重要的 实质性和程序性法律的复杂性之间的区别。 在 具体说明赔偿责任规则对 避免事故的激励措施，考虑到以下可能性： 双方都可能认为自己是受害者，法院犯错误 在决定责任时，法院使用的适当注意标准， 确定责任可能会有很大的不同情况下，司机 自己可能会犯错误。 对这些问题的理论和实证分析， 阐明了我们对经济效率存在的理解 以及法律的无效性及其影响。 大部分 对法律的学说的复杂性的考察， 给出 相反，本研究的一部分侧重于法律的 复杂性作为律师在其角色中可以操纵的一个因素， 立法者和法官，并对律师作为 诉讼律师 它研究了在不同国家之间的关系模式， 复杂程度和诉讼的预期结果。 的 该项目有可能增加我们对经济和 法律的复杂性的社会影响，特别是通过 制定一个规范模型，考虑是否有任何 社会收益，也就是说，任何准确的概率增加， 判决，从采用超过最低限度的法律的目标， 复杂. 项目的实证分析应用 在重新考虑激励措施的背景下， 避免事故的结构将有助于我们理解 在无法确定的情况下， 谁是加害者，谁是受害者。

Economic considerations shape the contours of litigation and may serve as deterrents to negligent behavior which in turn could lead to litigation. Estimates of the magnitude and probability of gain may be expected to shape lawyers' preferences for a given level of complexity of legal doctrines. Such estimates also operate through liability rules to affect incentives to take care to avoid accidents. Specifically, Dr. White focuses on two topics in the area where law and economics intersect: 1) modeling the level of complexity of legal doctrines and 2) re-examining the dominant liability rule in U. S. law, the comparative negligence rule in accident law, and conducting empirical analysis of the application of negligence rules using a data set of automobile accidents in Calfornia. The investigation of the model of legal complexity and how it affects the behavior of lawyers and litigants and the outcome of cases includes consideration of the implications of different modes of payment for lawyers and of cases involving tax law in which the plaintiff is always the IRS, which has the double objective of maximizing the amount of unpaid taxes collected via audits or litigations and of minimizing taxpayers' incentives to evade taxes in the first place. Also, the study draws the important distinction between substantive and procedural legal complexity. In the specification of a model of the effects of liability rules on accident avoidance incentives, account is taken of the possibility that both parties may consider themselves victims, that courts make errors in deciding liability, that the due care standard used by courts to determine liabililty may vary widely across cases, and that drivers themselves may make mistakes. The theoretical and empirical analyses on these topics promise to illuminate our understanding of the existence of economic efficiencies and inefficiencies of the law and their impact. Most of the examinations of the complexity of legal doctrines have assumed it as given. In contrast, one portion of this study focuses on legal complexity as an element manipulable by lawyers in their roles as legislators and judges and having an effect on lawyers in their role as litigators. It examines the patterns of the relationship between the level of complexity and the predicted outcome of litigation. The project has the potential to increase our knowledge of the economic and social implications of legal complexity, particularly by means of developing a normative model, which considers whether there is any social gain, that is, any increase in the probability of an accurate verdict, from adopting legal objectives that are more than minimally complex. The project's empirical analysis of the application of negligence rules in the context of a reconsideration of the incentive structure for avoiding accidents will contribute to our understanding of liability under circumstances where it cannot be determined in advance who is the injurer and who is the victim.