Enforcement and Compliance Decisions under OSHA and EPA Regulation

在过去的几年里，有许多 监管的人种学或定性案例研究 执法过程。 尽管这些研究很有帮助，但它们并没有 提供了系统的，有理论根据的分析， 监管执法实践与 合规 此外，很少有广泛的定量 研究表明，可衡量的政治和经济 各种变量影响执行技术和遵守程度。 这项研究将收集与这些问题有关的宝贵数据， 提供了一个有用的统计关系图， 相关因素。 该项目将审查遵守和执行情况 两个监管机构中的四个监管计划的相关决定 机构：劳工组织对工人健康和工人安全的管理 职业安全和健康管理局， 水污染和空气污染的环境保护 社 两组经济和监管变量数据将 成立于1973年至1986年。 第一 数据集将包含450个行业，涵盖制造业 部门 第二个数据集将包含公司级和工厂级 三大制造业数据。 分析将允许 同时估计机构的决定， 分配其执行跨公司和公司的决定， 是否遵守机构的规定 两 决策将取决于观察到的经济、政治和 技术因素。 这项研究的结果应该提供一个重要的 有助于我们理解 监管机构的执法活动和 他们监管的公司。 除了对理论的贡献之外， 监管机构的行为和影响以及法律的合规性， 这些结果可能表明，各机构可以改善 提高其执法战略的效率， 考虑到他们的可用资源，最终， 提高生产率。 此外，数据库将 准备将是一个宝贵的工具，进一步研究项目， 类似的话题。

Over the past several years, there have been numerous ethnographic or qualitative case studies of regulatory enforcement processes. Although helpful, such studies have not provided systematic, empirically-grounded analyses of the relationship between regulatory enforcement practices and compliance. Moreover, there are few wide-ranging quantitative studies indicating how measurable political and economic variables affect enforcement techniques and compliance levels. This study will amass valuable data relevant to these issues and provide a useful mapping of statistical relationships among relevant factors. The project will examine the compliance and enforcement decisions related to four regulatory programs in two regulatory agencies: regulation of worker health and worker safety by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and regulation of water pollution and air pollution by the Environmental Protection Agency. Two data sets of economic and regulatory variables will be created covering the period from 1973 to 1986. The first dataset will contain 450 industries, covering the manufacturing sector. The second dataset will contain company and plant-level data for three manufacturing industries. The analysis will allow for simultaneous estimation of the agency's decision of how to allocate its enforcement across firms and the firm's decision of whether or not to comply with the agency's regulations. Both decisions will depend on observed economic, political, and technological factors. The results of this research should provide a significant contribution to our understanding of the interaction between enforcement activities of regulators and compliance decisions of the firms they regulate. Beyond contributing to theory on the behavior and impact of regulatory agencies and legal compliance, the results may indicate ways in which agencies can improve the efficiency of their enforcement strategies, gaining greater compliance given their available resources, and, ultimately, improving productivity. In addition, the databases to be prepared will be a valuable tool for further research projects on similar topics.