The Strategic Role of Debt: Can Leverage Influence Bargaining Outcomes?

本项目调查杠杆作用的战略作用 在与高级利益攸关方重新谈判合同期间。 特别是，以债务替代股权， 股东，被定义为对以下事项有酌处权的初级索赔人： 投资决策，与工会讨价还价。 这个概念是，股权退出与高 杠杆合理地改变了股东的事后激励， 除非重新谈判工会对公司的要求，否则工会不会投资。 该项目的第一部分考虑了一个模型，在该模型中， 盈利能力和投资机会是众所周知的。 两 将探讨合同重新谈判的类型;在第一个 工资重新谈判，在第二个工资和债务 合同重新谈判。 初步结果表明，高 杠杆只会在利润较低的自然状态下被选择 未来的投资机会似乎很有希望。 的 股东改变公司资本结构的能力 导致风险的低效率分配。 项目的第二部分涉及扩展基本模型 来整合不完整的信息。 可合理推断 股东们比其他人有更好的信息 利益相关者对公司未来的盈利能力和/或 投资机会。 然后，债务可能表明公司的 盈利 信息不对称将导致崩溃 在谈判中，因此会产生低效率， 次优投资决策 这项研究将为我们的研究做出重大贡献。 理解债务和资本的战略使用 结构问题。

This project investigates the strategic role that leverage plays during the renegotiation of contracts with senior stakeholders. In particular, the substitution of debt for equity allows shareholders, defined as junior claimants with discretion over investment decisions, to bargain advantageously with the union. The notion is that equity withdrawal in combination with high leverage credibly alters the shareholders' ex post incentives to invest unless the union's claim on the firm is renegotiated. The first part of the project considers a model in which the firm's profitability and investment opportunities are commonly known. Two types of contract renegotiation will be explored; in the first wages are renegotiated, and in the second both wage and debt contracts are renegotiated. Preliminary results suggest that high leverage will only be chosen in less profitable states of nature when future investment opportunities appear promising. The shareholders' ability to alter the capital structure of the firm leads to an inefficient allocation of risk. The second part of the project involes extending the basic model to incorporate incomplete information. It is reasonable to suppose that the shareholders have better information than the other stakeholders regarding the firm's future profitability and/or investment opportunities. Debt may then signal the firm's profitability. Informational asymmetries will lead to breakdowns in negotiations, and thus an inefficiency will be generated by suboptimal investment decisions. This research will make a significant contribution to our understanding of the strategic use of debt and the capital structure problem.