No Manipulable and Fair Allocation of Private Goods

本研究涉及简单私人物品情形下的分配，例如计算机网络中传输容量的分配。一个强有力的例子可以证明，在这样的问题中(i)不可操控性（即优势策略）是一个非常理想的属性，（ii）用公平标准取代帕累托效率的要求是明智的——特别是因为效率和不可操控性是不一致的要求，以及（iii）在全局匿名保持的情况下，局部连续独裁是可以接受的。结果表明，序列社会选择函数满足这些条件。这项研究是为了描述一类满足这些标准的机制。这个项目是对分配私人物品的不受战略限制的机制进行系统分析的出发点。它代表了一个重要而令人兴奋的方向，即增加我们对分配机制及其性能特征的了解。该项目不仅有望对经济理论做出实质性贡献，还将影响企业和公共机构分配某些稀缺生产资源（如计算机网络）的方式。

This research concerns allocation in simple private goods situations such as assignment of transmission capacity in a computer network. A strong case can be made that in such problems (i) non manipulability (i.e., dominant strategies) is a very desirable property, (ii) replacing the requirement of Pareto efficiency with a fairness criterion is sensible - particularly since efficiency and non manipulability are inconsistent requirements, and (iii) local serial dictatorship is acceptable provided anonymity holds globally. It has been shown that the serial social choice function satisfies these criteria. This research is to characterize the class of mechanisms that satisfy these criteria. This project is the point of departure for a systematic analysis of strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating private goods. It represents an important and exciting direction in which to increase our knowledge of allocation mechanisms and their performance characteristics. Not only does the project promise to contribute to the body of economic theory in a substantial way, it will affect the ways firms and public bodies allocate certain scarce productive resources (such as computer networks).