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Global Change: International Negotiations on Emissions Control

Global Change: International Negotiations on Emissions Control
全球变化:排放控制国际谈判
批准号:
9110460
负责人:
Geoffrey Heal
金额:
$6.73万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1992
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1992-03-15 至 1994-02-28

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中文摘要
翻译
这个项目的目的是分析战略方面的问题, 关于减少排放的国际协定, 造成跨界污染。 一些研究人员认为 获得国际合作的问题 一个囚徒困境博弈的结构, 如果他们合作会更好,但是他们中的任何一个都有一个 欺骗或违反规则的动机。 两个重要问题 提出了使用该框架的适当性 用于分析与污染有关的国际协议 问题 一个是囚犯困境结构是否 在这种情况下是合适的。 第二个问题是,即使 就是合作解决不了。 合作更容易在重复博弈中发生 在相同的情况下,当相同的当事人面对对方的时间后, 这是国际关系中经常出现的情况。 本研究将建立一个理论框架, 国家间合作的演变 国际减排控制。 这种合作可以通过 合作框架内的联盟,或通过默示协议 在重复博弈中通过触发策略出现 两 在这个项目中将采用各种办法。 的概念 在理论框架中引入了批判联盟 这是一个由同意实施一项 具有一定稳定性的减排协议。 这 项目很重要,因为它将产生有用的见解, 关于全球变化的国际谈判进程, 为选择谈判框架提供基础, 这些战略将导致稳定和积极的结果。
英文摘要
The purpose of this project is to analyze the strategic aspects of international agreement on the abatement of emissions that cause transboundary pollution. Some researchers have suggested that the problem of obtaining international cooperation has the structure of a prisoners' dilemma game in that all parties would be better off if they cooperated, but any one of them has an incentive to cheat or break the rules. Two important questions are raised about the appropriateness of using the this framework for analyzing international agreements related to pollution problems. One is whether the prisoners' dilemma construct is appropriate in this context. And the second is whether, even if it is, a cooperative solution will not be forthcoming. Cooperation is more likely to occur in a repeated game situations, where the same parties face each other time after time as is often the case with international relations. This research will develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the evolution of cooperation between countries in the area of international abatement control. Such cooperation can emerge via coalitions in a cooperative framework, or by tacit agreements that emerge via trigger strategies in repeated games. Both approaches will be pursued in this project. The notion of a critical coalition is introduced into the theoretical framework which is a coalition of countries agreeing to implement an abatement agreement that has certain stability properties. This project is important because it will produce useful insights into the process of international negotiation on global change, and provide a basis for choosing negotiating frameworks and strategies that will lead to stable and positive outcomes.
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I-Corps: Platform that matches users with renewable energy suppliers while providing on-demand energy analytics
  • 批准号:
    2037753
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $5.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 负责人:
    Geoffrey Heal
  • 依托单位:
International Environmental Agreements
  • 批准号:
    9696057
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $13.5万
  • 财政年份:
    1995
  • 负责人:
    Geoffrey Heal
  • 依托单位:
International Environmental Agreements
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