权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

International Environmental Agreements

国际环境协议

基本信息

批准号：
9309610
负责人：
Geoffrey Heal
金额：
$ 6.56万
依托单位：
National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Continuing Grant
财政年份：
1993
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
1993-11-15 至 1997-04-30
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9309610&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
International Environmental Agreements

项目摘要

9309610 Heal This research will further develop the issue raised in the investigator's paper "International Negotiations on Emission Control." That paper studies the incentives that countries have to join and to remain in international agreements on the abatement of global pollution. It develops the concept of a critical abatement coalition, one with the property that all members are net gainers from membership. There will be a smallest critical coalition because of certain threshold effects. One of the earlier paper's results is to identify as very important in the stability of coalitions the extent of cross effects on net benefits between countries that join a coalition. These will be referred to as "reinforcement mechanisms." In particular, the stability of agreements is increased by the extent to which abatement by country i increases the marginal net benefit of country j from abatement by j. This research will identify and model ways in which the introduction of abatement policies by one country could reduce the abatement costs of another and provide reinforcement mechanisms. The research will then take two initial steps towards empirically implementing the ideas of critical coalitions and reinforcement mechanisms. One will be a preliminary attempt to identify alternative minimum critical coalitions for the avoidance of global climate change. The second will be a preliminary identification of reinforcement mechanisms. ***

9309610 Heal 这项研究将进一步发展研究者论文“国际排放控制谈判”中提出的问题。该论文研究了各国必须加入并留在减少全球污染的国际协议中的激励措施。它提出了关键减排联盟的概念，该联盟的特点是所有成员都是成员资格的净受益者。由于某些阈值效应，将会存在最小的关键联盟。早期论文的结果之一是，确定了加入联盟的国家之间净收益的交叉影响程度对于联盟的稳定性非常重要。这些将被称为“强化机制”。特别是，协议的稳定性随着国家 i 的减排增加国家 j 从 j 的减排中获得的边际净收益的程度而增加。这项研究将确定并模拟一国引入减排政策可以降低另一国减排成本并提供强化机制的方式。然后，该研究将采取两个初步步骤，以实证方式实施关键联盟和强化机制的想法。其中之一将是初步尝试确定替代的最低限度关键联盟，以避免全球气候变化。二是初步确定强化机制。 ***