International Environmental Agreements

9309610治愈这项研究将进一步发展研究人员论文《排放控制的国际谈判》中提出的问题。这篇论文研究了各国必须加入和保留在减少全球污染的国际协议中的激励措施。它提出了关键减排联盟的概念，该联盟的特点是所有成员都是成员资格的净受益者。由于某些门槛效应，将会有一个最小的批评联盟。早期论文的一个结果是，确定加入联盟的国家之间对净收益的交叉影响程度对联盟的稳定性非常重要。这些将被称为“强化机制”。特别是，通过国家一的减排增加国家j从减排中获得的边际净收益的程度，提高了协议的稳定性。这项研究将查明和模拟一国采取减排政策可降低另一国的减排成本并提供强化机制的方式。然后，研究将采取两个初步步骤，以经验方式实施关键联盟和强化机制的想法。一是初步尝试确定避免全球气候变化的替代最低限度关键联盟。第二个将是初步确定加固机制。***

9309610 Heal This research will further develop the issue raised in the investigator's paper "International Negotiations on Emission Control." That paper studies the incentives that countries have to join and to remain in international agreements on the abatement of global pollution. It develops the concept of a critical abatement coalition, one with the property that all members are net gainers from membership. There will be a smallest critical coalition because of certain threshold effects. One of the earlier paper's results is to identify as very important in the stability of coalitions the extent of cross effects on net benefits between countries that join a coalition. These will be referred to as "reinforcement mechanisms." In particular, the stability of agreements is increased by the extent to which abatement by country i increases the marginal net benefit of country j from abatement by j. This research will identify and model ways in which the introduction of abatement policies by one country could reduce the abatement costs of another and provide reinforcement mechanisms. The research will then take two initial steps towards empirically implementing the ideas of critical coalitions and reinforcement mechanisms. One will be a preliminary attempt to identify alternative minimum critical coalitions for the avoidance of global climate change. The second will be a preliminary identification of reinforcement mechanisms. ***